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INTRODUCTION
Measuring gender gaps in agriculture
Although the importance of women’s contribution to the agricultural sector in developing
countries is now widely acknowledged, there is little systematic evidence on how gender gaps in
control over resources have changed over time in response to agricultural policy and
technological interventions. In particular, few large-scale, national-level studies examine these
effects for developing countries. This is surprising in light of the pervasive impact of agricultural
technology and policy innovation on gender differences in control over productive resources for
agriculture. Women are farmers and agricultural laborers in every part of the world. They are
often responsible for the storage and processing of agricultural products. In some parts of the
world, they play a key role in marketing crops. In almost all contexts, they play a central role in
ensuring household food security, a goal that in turn affects crop choice and other agricultural
decisions. Thus, every agricultural intervention is likely to impact women and, depending on the
particular context of gender relations, impact them differently from men (Meinzen-Dick et al
2011).
This gap in research is an anomaly given the current pressure on agricultural research
and development (R&D) to demonstrate and document reductions in gender inequality (FAO
2010; World Bank 2012; ISPC 2014). Although studies investigating gender gaps in control over
agricultural resources have recently increased in number and scope, the absence of national
level data means these studies are often based on small samples and descriptive rather than
analytical. This limits our ability to predict how technology and policy-based innovations will
affect gender inequality and how gender might affect choices about technology, land, labor, and
other productive resources.
There is an unmet need for relatively simple, robust indicators that can be used for
tracking short-to-medium outcomes of innovative technology, policy, and organizational
interventions in an agricultural production process. This type of monitoring is especially needed
to inform the design of interventions that may otherwise inadvertently change gender relations,
and to provide timely corrective feedback if these generate or exacerbate gender gaps in
unanticipated ways. This paper aims to guide the development of new indicators useful for
seeking sharply focused feedback on a specific innovation in an agricultural production process.
Specific innovation refers to the introduction of a new crop variety, livestock management
regime, cropping system, resource conservation practice, or marketing arrangement, for
example. Use of any of these can be constrained by gender inequality and can also alter it.
In this respect, this analysis differs from efforts to build comprehensive measures of
women’s control or empowerment that aggregate such effects. The paper argues that a change
in one or more specific indicators of a gender gap in control over resources will not necessarily
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correlate with a change in women’s empowerment. Nonetheless, the indicators evaluated in this
paper will be useful for monitoring whether an innovation in the agricultural production process
is on track toward reducing gender equality and increasing the well-being of women and men.
The development of suitable indicators for this purpose faces a number of difficulties.
Apart from a deficit of national-level data, there is a lack of agreement about the definition and
measurement of indicators of gender gaps in control over agricultural resources. Developing
robust indicators requires a level of conceptual clarity on causal pathways, on the definition of
“control” over resources, and on appropriate data collection procedures – such as the question
of who should be interviewed and whether the appropriate unit of analysis is an individual or
household. Furthermore, the indicators and data collection methods chosen must strike a
balance between conceptual clarity and logistical feasibility, particularly if the goal is to track the
indicators over time.
Despite these difficulties, this paper explores the extent to which it is possible to define
simple, robust indicators of gender gaps in use and control over resources that are likely to
impact and be affected by agricultural innovation. To address this question, the paper makes
the following contributions to the literature:
1. The identification of conceptual criteria of particular importance for developing
robust, rich indicators of change in gender gaps and for evaluating their utility
2. Analysis of the robustness and feasibility of the gender gap indicators used by
published studies, from which we generate a “menu” of potentially useful indicators
3. Recommendations for indicators based on evaluation of the menu of indicators
identified in (2)
4. A review of sources of national-level data currently available and suggestions for
data that need to be collected for constructing these indicators
The target audience for recommendations are researchers and development
practitioners involved in designing and implementing agricultural innovations who need to
monitor the direct and indirect impacts. These indicators are relevant primarily for users whose
main objective is not the study of gender relations but who need evaluations of the effect of
specific innovations on women’s ability to control resources.
With this application in mind, the paper also proposes a short “dashboard” of indicators.
The purpose of the dashboard is to provide feedback in the short term to ensure that innovators
are alerted if gender gaps seem to worsen. The dashboard is intended to make it easy for
innovators to re-evaluate the design and implementation of an intervention in an agricultural
production process while it is in progress. By short term, we mean within no more than three to
five years after the introduction of an innovation while there is still time for the intervention to
self-correct, and before final impacts can be measured or even achieved. The dashboard we
have compiled based on available data or existing data collection instruments has several
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limitations, discussed later in the paper. However, based on the information in this paper,
potential users could adapt this dashboard to serve their goals.
This analysis is motivated by the conviction that gender inequality matters for
“evaluative” reasons, as a desirable end in itself (Sen 1999). Although it is tempting to argue
that decreases in gender inequalities in turn result in greater adoption and use of agricultural
innovations, the evidence on this is somewhat mixed, in part because the innovations
themselves have often been generated without consideration of gender relations. Although this
paper does not address gender inequalities in the development of technologies, , there is a
need for greater consideration of women’s needs and voices in the research and development
process that leads to the development of agricultural technology.

What do we seek to measure?
The central question that that each of the recommended indicators will help answer is
“What are the gender differences in control over key resources in the agricultural production
process?” As discussed in detail in the next section, developing a refined notion of control is a
necessary prelude to answering this question.

Definition of control in an agricultural production process
These indicators are restricted to understanding the agricultural production process,
which are the transactions (human, financial, natural, political, and social) that occur on a farm
or in a farming system supporting the agricultural livelihoods of men, women, and children.
Land, livestock, common property resources such as water and forest resources, financial
assets, and labor power are the key resources in this production process.1 In each case, we
then recommend indicators of women’s ability to exercise rights over these resources as well as
equivalent indicators for men’s ability to exercise rights over these same resources; both are
necessary to measure changing gender gaps. We also consider measures of women’s and
men’s ability to control household income and participate in extra-household collective decisionmaking processes. These are important indicators of the extent to which individuals are able to
influence the economic and political contexts that will shape their access to resources in the
future (Meinzen-Dick et al 2011).

1This

report uses the definition of data, metrics, and indicators employed in the 2014 ISPC report on Data, Metrics
and Monitoring in CGIAR (ISPC 2014). Metrics are thus computed by aggregating raw data, while indicators are
summary measures that reflect system properties. The ISPC report argues that metrics become indicators when they
are used for decision-making; thus, “all indicators are metrics, but not vice versa.”
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Computation of gender gaps
For each indicator we recommend, we present two components: one that measures
women’s rights over that particular resource and one that measures men’s. Table 1 illustrates
how these two measures comprise the constituent elements of any measure of a gender gap
although computation of the gender gap itself can take many forms. As summarized in Table 1,
a gender gap can be expressed in terms of the ratio of the female measure to the male
measure, the absolute difference between the male and female measures, or the percentage
difference between them, with either the male or the female measure as the baseline.2
Table 1: Computing a gender gap indicator
Constituent measures:
1. Indicator of men's resource rights, for example, the proportion of men who own land, m1
2. Indicator of women's resource rights, for example, the proportion of women who own land, f1
As an example, if f1 = 10% or 0.1 and m1 = 50% or 0.5.

Forms of the gender gap:
1. A ratio of the female to male measure: f1/m1
where 1 signals no gender gap,
<1 indicates a gender gap in favor of men, and
>1 indicates a gender gap in favor of women.
In this case: gap = 1/5 or 0.2.
2. The difference between the female and male measures: f1 ‒ m1
where 0 signals no gender gap,
<0 indicates a gender gap in favor of men, and
>0 indicates a gender gap in favor of women.
In this case, gap = 0.1 ‒ 0.5 = ‒0.4.
3. The percentage difference between the female and male measures, with the male measure as the
base: 100* (f1 ‒ m1)/m1
where 0 signals no gender gap,
<0 signals a gender gap in favor of men, and
>0 signals a gender gap in favor of women.
The size of the gender gap is normalized against the proportion of male landowners. In this case, gap =
‒80%.
4.The percentage difference between the female and male measures, with the female measure as the
base: 100* (f1 ‒ m1)/f1
where 0 signals no gender gap,
<0 signals a gender gap in favor of men, and
>0 signals a gender gap in favor of women.
The size of the gender gap is normalized against the proportion of female landowners. In this case, gap
= ‒400%.

2

For simplicity, we prefer the ratio of the female measure to the male measure, expressed as a percentage. This is a
gender gap measure that is familiar in that it resembles the components of the UN Gender Inequality Index, while
also being relatively easy to interpret.
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Interpretation of gender gaps
Whatever the form of the final gender gap computation, a narrowing of the gender gap is
not desirable if it is the result of a “race to the bottom” – when the gap is narrowed entirely
because rural men are worse off, as, for example, when they lose control over resources. It is
therefore important for researchers to establish a baseline and maintain data on the constituent
elements of any gender gap calculation.
Decreasing gender gaps within agriculture (even where there is no “race to the bottom”)
does not necessarily imply an overall increase in women’s empowerment. The debate is
ongoing about the degree to which a feminization of the agricultural workforce is occurring in
different parts of the world, but what is less controversial is the fact that agriculture across most
of Asia, Latin America, and Africa is the “lesser half” of a diversified livelihood structure in which
nonfarm work, often in urban and peri-urban areas, is key to mobility and income growth
(Razavi 2009). Thus, women’s increasing control over agricultural resources and decisionmaking may not imply that they necessarily have a greater voice or power in the local or
national economy.
In this respect, our goal is complementary to, but distinct from, recent projects such as
the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI), which creates a single index of
women’s overall degree of empowerment in agricultural societies, both within and outside of
agricultural production processes (Alkire et al 2013). We do not seek to measure overall
empowerment but rather gender gaps in control over specific resources in the agricultural
production process. For agricultural R&D, when designing and implementing specific
interventions, such as the introduction of a new crop variety or livestock feeding regime,
identifying an effect on aggregate empowerment may be difficult to detect and not very
informative. For example, a decrease in aggregate empowerment correlated with the
introduction of a new variety begs the question of whether gender differences in preferred
varietal traits or access to seed, fertilizer, land, or extension training were the primary obstacle.
Without information on specific gender gaps and their contribution to a particular outcome, it is
difficult for to correct the intervention.
Thus, we are not proposing a single index, but rather a range of indicators along with
criteria for evaluating the contexts in which they may work best. The type of monitoring and
evaluation process we aim to support with recommended indicators needs to generate feedback
about changes in gender equality in the short and medium term in order to self-correct.
Therefore, the proposed indicators build on existing data and are both specific and sensitive to
change in the short as well as medium to long term. As noted below, measures of the value
(rather than quantity) of resources controlled by men and women may be especially well suited
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to capturing changes in the short term, even if they remain logistically difficult to generate (Doss
et al 2013).
In the following section, we begin by discussing the criteria that emerged out of the
literature review as well as some of the potential challenges of trying to satisfy these criteria. We
then apply these criteria to generate a set of recommended indicators and evaluate the extent to
which they meet our various criteria.

CRITERIA FOR MEASURING GENDER GAPS IN RESOURCES
This section presents ten criteria derived from the literature review that can be used to
evaluate the utility of indicators proposed for measuring gender gaps in control over resources
used in an agricultural production process. Of these, five are conceptual while the remaining
relate to issues of measurement. Conceptual criteria are important because the statement that a
woman or man “has control over a resource” raises a number of difficult questions. Do we mean
this individual is the only one with control? Or do we mean this individual has shared (or joint)
control? (Deere and Doss 2006). And, what do we mean by control, since use, control, and
ownership are related but somewhat different sets of rights (Meinzen-Dick et al 2011).
Furthermore, rights that exist “on paper” (de jure rights) may not always exist on the ground (de
facto rights). If we want to measure gender gaps in such rights, there is also the complication
that rights over resources have traditionally been measured at the level of the household and
that the focus has often been on the physical quantity, rather than the value, of resources (Doss
et al 2015). In this section, we begin by discussing the conceptual criteria that we apply to
identify robust indicators of such gender gaps.
Collecting the data for indicators that meet these criteria raises measurement issues. We
therefore also develop and discuss criteria for evaluating indicators against these measurement
issues. For example, given the complex conceptual issues that are raised by an attempt to
measure gender gaps in agricultural resources, more nuanced indicators are also likely to be
somewhat resource intensive to construct and track over time. Our aim is to minimize the
resource intensity of data collection to the extent possible, but some indicators perform better on
that criterion than others.
We recommend only indicators that meet at least the first four conceptual criteria and the
first two measurement criteria summarized in Box 1. As discussed in the review of the literature
that follows in the next section, and is summarized in the tables in Appendix 2, we evaluate our
indicators against all of the criteria and note the degree to which these criteria are met.
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Box 1. Criteria for evaluating indicators of gender gaps in control over productive
resources
Conceptual issues: Does the indicator of a gender gap







capture the differences between control and use rights: where rights to control (to manage,
exclude others or alienate the resource) may not be the same as rights to use (to access the
resource and withdraw the output)?
capture de facto rights in preference to de jure rights?
measure joint rights (shared among individuals but not necessarily equal) as well as sole
rights?
disaggregate rights and decision-making by sex of the respondent rather than by sex of the
household head?
measure the value of resources as well as (or instead of) the quantity of resources?

Measurement issues: Is the gender gap indicator based on






quantitative data, with qualitative validation?
data that can be readily collected at several different points in time?
data that are easily replicable across sites, countries, or regions?
data that are not resource intensive to collect because they are already being collected at
scale or could feasibly be included in a large-scale survey?
short- or medium-term outcomes (as distinct from impacts that take a long time for
measureable change to occur), especially gaps related to use and to the value of resources?

1. Does the gender gap indicator capture layered rights: use, control, and
ownership?
In the conventional economics literature, ownership is equated with individual property
rights, in particular the rights to exclude and alienate. The argument made is that such rights
maximize the incentives of resource owners to invest in and improve the productivity of their
resources. However, in a paradox often noted by feminists, the advocacy of this system appears
to end where the household begins (Agarwal 1994, 1997). Economists have been content to
measure ownership at the household rather than individual level, and to assume that the (male)
household head is the owner of such property (Deere and Doss 2006). And, while in the last two
decades the notion of the “unitary household” has fallen out of favor in mainstream analyses of
consumption and labor allocation, few data exist on the intra-household distribution of wealth
and property. In agricultural settings, we have learned a great deal about women’s participation
in agricultural labor (as family and wage workers), but far less about their use of and control
over other productive resources, including the labor of others.
More recently, a small body of literature has begun to examine the extent and
implications of intra-household gender gaps in asset ownership. These studies show that
women across the world tend to own fewer assets and own assets of lower value than men
(Deere and León 2001, Doss et al 2014b). However, this literature also shows that traditional
measures of asset ownership collected at the household rather than intra-household level can
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sharply underestimate the extent to which women claim and exercise rights over productive
assets, including in agriculture (Twyman et al 2015). The lack of data on such rights at the intrahousehold level then means that agricultural intervention programs may not be reaching
household members with the de facto ability to affect the uptake of new agricultural production
technologies.
Conceptually, thinking about the distribution of property rights within households requires
thinking about the layering of rights since different members of the household may have
different rights ranging from use to control, and to the right to alienate (Johnson et al 2015).
Thus, the husband may claim the right to sell or rent the home, but the wife uses and may
participate in decision-making about improvements to the home. She may thus have substantial
incentives to maintain and upgrade her home even in the absence of rights to alienate and
exclude. Indeed, efforts to maintain and upgrade the home may fail without her cooperation and
active participation.
These critiques of mainstream understandings of property rights echo those in the
literature on common pool resources. There too, layers of rights exist across different
community members, producing incentives for resource maintenance and improvement that do
not always align with the predictions of mainstream economists. The literature on gendered
rights over resources thus draws upon the framework developed in this literature on common
pool resource management even if most of that latter literature does not itself enter within the
walls of the household (Doss and Meinzen-Dick 2015).
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) identify rights over resources as extending from (i) entry or
access (physically accessing the resource, for example: stepping onto the land), (ii) withdrawal
(the ability to use the output from the resource), (iii) management rights or decision-making
about the use of the resource (including crop choice and choice of agricultural technologies), (iv)
exclusion rights, and (v) rights of alienation (decision-making about the sale, lease, transfer, or
bequeathing of the resource).
They point out that in most cases entry rights are bundled together with withdrawal rights
to comprise operational rights that help allocate current benefits from resource use. However,
the remaining three rights they classify as collective choice rights that allow holders of such
rights to determine future operational rights. From the mainstream efficiency perspective, the
latter may be decisive in shaping incentives to improve and maintain the resource, as opposed
to allowing it to degrade. From an equity perspective, the latter also more strongly shape the
ability to accumulate wealth and thus the degree of wealth inequality, which is a key
consequence of differential rights to assets and resources.
We follow this literature in grouping together entry and withdrawal rights as “use or
access” rights and rights to make decisions about management, exclusion, and alienation as
“control” rights. In the case of physical resources such as land and livestock, data on patterns
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of labor allocation can help us obtain a sense of a person’s “entry” rights of access to such
resources. Withdrawal rights, on the other hand, require not only the ability to access output
from the resources (for example, harvest the crop) but also the ability to exercise some measure
of influence over how the output is used (whether to sell or eat the harvest, for example).3 In this
paper, we therefore propose using indicators of labor use to track some patterns of access
to/use of land and livestock while also proposing indicators of control over the resource output
to capture withdrawal rights.
Thus, “control rights” capture the degree to which women and men are able to exercise
management, exclusion, and alienation rights over the resource itself, and we propose some
indicators of control rights across different resources. Throughout the paper, we treat these
“control rights” as more decisively linked to gender equity and potential long-term changes in the
gender wealth gap.
The term “ownership” in the Schlager and Ostrom formulation refers to the existence of
all five kinds of rights bundled together. Thus, a woman may be said to own land if she,
individually or jointly, holds all these five rights to land. However, as Doss et al (2013) point out,
in different contexts, women and men may use the word ownership to address varying subsets
of these rights. In particular, the right to alienate may not exist in regions where markets for
resources are thin or nonexistent, so “ownership” may refer only to use, management, and
exclusion rights. The term ownership is often used in such contexts to mean formally recognized
use and control rights (usually including some rights to exclude others), that may or may not be
accompanied by the right to alienate the land without the agreement of others.
In thinking about indicators that both build upon existing data sets but are also
conceptually clear, we thus face something of a conundrum. Although we conceptualize
ownership as the “super set” of these five rights, this more specific definition prevents us from
using many existing data sets that are building questions about ownership into their surveys
without specifying which of the rights the term refers to. In some contexts, such surveys may be
the only information available about the intra-household distribution of rights over productive
resources. Furthermore, these indicators, while varying in meaning, do capture what
anthropologists would call “local knowledge” about ownership and thus perhaps describe the de
facto situation on the ground.
One recommendation that emerges from this is the need for indicators of use and control
that do not use the word ownership per se. However, we do want to make use of available data
on ownership, even while urging greater attention to these conceptual issues on the part of
those developing such data sets. Thus, where indicators of “ownership” are available, we do

3

This means that slave and wage laborers engaged in harvesting would not have withdrawal rights by this definition.
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recommend using them, with the caveat that such indicators may not be easy to aggregate
across contexts, since they may incorporate very different bundles of rights in different contexts.

2. Does the gender gap indicator measure for de facto as against de jure rights?
In developing countries, weak states and the co-existence of traditional and modern
constitutional legal systems often mean that there can be considerable divergence between
documented claims that can hold up in formal courts of law and what the community accepts as
a legitimate claim or right. A “legally pluralistic” approach that does not rely only on documented
formal claims of ownership is thus necessary to understand ownership as it exists on the ground
(Doss et al 2014a). Although the evidence suggests that women have fewer ownership rights
than men to most kinds of productive assets across the world, it is not clear which system,
customary or statutory constitutional, is more biased against women. In some contexts, such as
traditionally matrilineal communities, custom may provide women with more ownership rights
than formal legal systems, while in others the situation may be reversed.4
On the other hand, de facto access to resources may not match the patterns of
ownership. Thus, a woman who owns land in her natal village may have little ability to use it
after moving to her husband’s village, while women without de jure rights to land may be able to
use land owned by their husband’s family (Hare et al 2007, Lin and Lixin 2006). De jure and de
facto rights thus overlap but are not synonymous with each other.
From the perspective of understanding the gendered impact of agricultural interventions,
it is useful to consider de facto rather than de jure claims. The recommended indicators are
based on self-reported “subjective” survey responses rather than on “objective” evidence of
documentation. This is not just a matter of pragmatics, but rather is grounded in the
understanding that marginalized groups are unlikely to have official claims to resources and that
efforts to work with such groups require us to acknowledge and validate the strength of their
“informal” claims to resources (Doss et al 2014a. Johnson et al 2015).

3. Does the gender gap indicator capture sole as well as joint rights?
As discussed above, there is a literature on “collective rights” over common pool
resources. Such “collective rights” exist where rights of use and control are vested in a
community or a collective body such as a water user group, both existing as aggregates of
member households (Meinzen Dick and Knox 1999, Ostrom 2003). Although collective rights
imply some degree of jointness in the exercise of rights, rights are jointly claimed and exercised

4

In both China and Rwanda, state-led allocation of land and regularization of land tenure appear to have been more
favorable to women than custom may have been (Hare et al 2007, Ali et al 2011).
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within the household as well. Most household assets are used and accessed by multiple
members of a household, with patterns of use by each individual varying seasonally and/or with
changes in the demographic composition of the household. This sharing of rights among
individuals is what we mean here by “jointness” in rights.
Since women’s access to assets is often mediated through their families, they are more
likely to be joint rather than sole owners of assets (Johnson et al 2015). They are also more
likely to participate in decision-making together with other family members rather than alone. In
certain countries, the marital regime – whether there is community property or separation of
property within the marriage – results in spouses owning property jointly even in de jure terms
(Deere et al 2013).
As discussed below, we do not privilege individual or sole use and control of assets over
joint use and control, given that the ultimate goal is one where women and men can participate
as equals in the common project of ensuring the well-being of a household or community (Deere
and Twyman 2012). We do emphasize, however, that jointness does not mean equality. To a
greater degree than joint rights, sole rights may improve exit options in ways that enhance intrahousehold bargaining power (Agarwal 1997). Nevertheless, indicators that do not measure joint
rights to assets fail to capture the lived reality of gendered patterns of access to resources. In
the resource-scarce agricultural contexts of the developing world, joint and collective rights may
also be the only feasible way to ensure broader access to assets for marginalized populations
(Rao 2006, Agarwal 2010b). We recommend that data be collected on sole as well as joint use
and control of resources so that researchers can combine them when appropriate but also be
able to analyze any differences between the two.

4. Does the gender gap indicator disaggregate rights and decision-making by sex
of the respondent rather than the household head?
As the social construction of biological difference, gender is a relational concept that
cannot be understood by studying either men or women in isolation from each other. The
extensive focus on female-headed households in prior research on agricultural contexts is thus
problematic in that it does not help us grasp the nature of gendered rights within the dualheaded households within which a majority of women live (Deere et al 2012). We use the
language of comparing dual-headed and single-headed households (rather than female- and
male-headed) and urge the development of indicators that look within both. In this review, we
largely exclude studies that simply compare female-headed households with male-headed
households.
The definition of rights we use is measured on the ground by a respondent’s ability to
influence decision-making about the use of the resource and/or the output from the resource.
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Almost all the indicators we recommend thus require data on decision-making by women and
men separately. The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) module on decision-making
about expenditure on daily goods and major goods, mobility, and health is an important example
of an ongoing attempt to collect data on decision-making (Subaiya and Kishor 2008). The recent
WEAI index also collects data on decision-making about agricultural production.
In the case of the DHS, however, questions on decision-making are answered only by
female members of the household. We argue here that surveys on decision-making should
comprise male and female respondents within both dual- and single-headed households.
Gender gaps in the exercise of rights over resources require data on decision-making from both
men and women. Extending surveys on decision-making to male and female respondents is
thus a key recommendation we make here.
In the interests of logistical feasibility, we do not recommend the more resourceintensive process of asking men and women within the same household to answer these
decision-making questions. We acknowledge that this would produce a much richer picture of
intra-household dynamics, but our goal here is to develop feasible indicators of gender gaps in
control over resources rather than to fully probe the intra-household dynamics of cooperation
and conflict. The Gallup/World Bank Findex survey provides a good example of the kind of
sampling methodology we consider practical. The survey collects data via telephone and faceto-face interviews on the financial usage of one respondent from each household surveyed. This
sampling strategy therefore ensures the inclusion of women respondents.
We should note that, as Deere and Twyman (2012) point out, an implicit assumption in
many studies of decision-making is that, when a woman has the sole or final say in an aspect of
decision-making, this represents a greater degree of female empowerment. On the other hand,
depending on the local gender division of labor, women having the final say in certain zones of
decision-making can simply be a sign that the household follows gender norms that may be
quite regressive for women overall. The desired goal may instead be joint decision-making in
which the members of the household participate as equals. Consistent with the rest of the
paper, therefore, we consider jointness in decision-making to be a legitimate indicator of female
voice.
One approach is to provide response options to decision-making questions that include
not just “alone,” “jointly with someone else,” and “entirely by someone else” but an additional
category of “not an area of decision-making because we are following norms”. This option may
capture the areas of decision-making that default to men and women due to custom, rather than
representing enhanced bargaining power Holvoet (2005).5 It is not clear yet how logistically
Holvoet (2005, 79) reports that “the category of ‘norm-following’ was less obvious as none of the interviewees
literally used the notion of ‘norm-following.’ Rather, they responded in such terms as ‘nobody’; ‘it is natural, we do not
need to take a decision on that’; ‘we do not really decide on that, we just do like we always have done’; ‘this is what
we always do, we do not need to take a decision on this’; ‘it is normal, everybody/nobody does.’”
5
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feasible such an option would be across locations, so we mark it as a possibility for
consideration in the future.

5. Does the gender gap indicator measure the value of resources as well as (or
instead of) the quantity of resources?
Technology-based innovations are likely to change the relative returns to different
productive assets and thus their value. In the case of land, without substantial land reform policy
from the government, patterns of control over land are deeply rooted in inheritance regimes and
are unlikely to change easily. Allocations of labor are also often the result of long-standing
norms that govern the gender division of labor. Although the prices of resources are also
influenced by deep-rooted forces of tradition and/or discrimination, the introduction of new
technologies may more easily change the value of resources and thus gender value gaps in
resources, for better or for worse. From a tracking perspective, shifts in value may thus be more
sensitive indicators of technological impacts.
As we discuss below, such changes in resource value are difficult to measure,
particularly in contexts in which markets are thin. As a result, indicators of such changes may
not always be feasible. Nevertheless, we urge greater consideration of such indicators by data
collection agencies given their relative sensitivity to changes in the wider socioeconomic
context.

6. Is the gender gap indicator based on quantitative data, with qualitative
validation?
The need to measure change over time favors the creation of a quantitative indicator. All
our recommended indicators are quantitative for this reason. However, since these are
quantitative measures based on household survey instruments, they require prior qualitative
work both to verify the relevance of the indicator in that particular context and to validate the
results of the quantitative measures. Qualitative work is also required to understand exactly
what it means that the indicator has changed and to disentangle alternative interpretations of
some of these changes.

7. Is the gender gap indicator based on data that can be readily collected at
several different points in time?
Most of the current empirical studies on gender gaps are small-scale studies that do not
claim to be nationally representative. Although an understanding of the specificities of the local
is extremely important, there is value in having some indicators that are produced at the national
level to allow for comparisons between countries. This is particularly true when agricultural
technologies are introduced on a large scale and benchmarks to track progress are also
required at that scale. In this paper, we focus on indicators that can be “scaled up” even as we
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acknowledge the limitations of such indicators and recommend local-level qualitative work to
tease out what changes in these indicators truly mean on the ground.
As discussed earlier, it is very important for an indicator to facilitate tracking gender gaps
over time. Simple, robust national-level data that can be integrated into existing surveys can
help accomplish that goal.

8. Is the gender gap indicator designed to minimize data requirements?
One of our goals was to suggest indicators in forms that minimize the resource intensity
of the data-gathering process. For example, we do not recommend indicators that require
sampling men and women within the same household despite the richness of the data
generated. We also discuss relatively simple forms of time-use surveys below.
We are especially interested in minimizing the need for additional primary data
collection. Thus, one criterion in evaluating possible indicators is the potential for integration
with existing forms of national and international data. Table 2 lists large household surveys that
have this potential. In particular, we looked for indicators that used data that is or could be
collected in the following existing international surveys: the DHS (Demographic and Health
Surveys), the LSMS (the Living Standards Measurement Surveys), the WEAI (Women’s
Empowerment in Agriculture Index), and the Global Findex survey.

Table 2: List of national multi-year household surveys referred to in the paper
Name of survey
Agency
Website
administering the
survey
LSMS and LSMS-ISA
Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS)
Women’s Empowerment in
Agriculture Index (WEAI)
Global Findex Survey

World Bank
The DHS Program

http://go.worldbank.org/BCLXW38HY0
www.dhsprogram.com/

IFPRI, USAID, and the
OHPI
World Bank

www.ifpri.org/topic/weai-resource-center
www.worldbank.org/en/programs/globalfind
ex

9. Is the gender gap indicator based on data that are easily replicable across
sites, countries, or regions?
Replicability, or a degree of universality that would allow the indicator to be meaningful
across contexts and across time, is also an important criterion. Although inter-country and intracountry regional differences are always important, we attempted to select indicators that
minimize such differences. In some instances, this has meant choosing less specific versions of
indicators. In other cases, such as the example of land ownership data above, we recognize
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that replicability remains a challenge. In Appendix Table 2, we flag some possible problems with
replicability that we anticipate in the indicators we have selected.

10. Is the gender gap indicator sensitive to short- and medium-term change?
In order for the indicators to help assess the impact of technological changes, a subset
needs to be especially sensitive to early signs of setbacks or progress in the achievement of
women’s control over assets and decision-making. Since such evaluations occur within a few
years, our goal was to identify a range of indicators, some of which could track short-term
changes (3-5 years) and some medium- and long-term changes (more than 5 years).
Developing such a range of indicators would also allow us to see whether any changes, for
better or for worse, were limited only to the short run and reversed themselves in the long run.
Given that studies that measure changes across time do not yet exist in the case of most
indicators we recommend, our analysis of the time sensitivity of indicators is based on our
conceptual framework. This suggests that indicators related to use and to the value of resources
are somewhat more likely to change in the short term than indicators of control and of the
quantity of resources controlled. Most fundamentally, the more control over a particular resource
is shaped by deep-rooted norms about gender, the less likely it is to change in the short run.
During the course of our literature review, we were struck by the paucity of studies that
do indeed track indicators over time. Some efforts in this direction, such as the Findex and
WEAI, are extremely promising, but many more are needed to generate a body of evidence on
the relative time sensitivity of these indicators.
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INDICATORS OF GENDER GAPS IN RESOURCE USE, CONTROL, AND
OWNERSHIP
In this section, we recommend indicators for tracking gender gaps in the use or control
of the following types of resources: land and livestock, water and forest common property
resources, financial assets, labor, and “participation in collective action.” The recommended
indicators are summarized in Boxes 1‒7 at the beginning of each section, followed by
discussion of the rationale for each. All of these indicators are based upon population (rather
than group) sampling methods.
All of these indicators were identified from an extensive literature review of small- and
large-scale empirical studies, narrowed down by the application of key conceptual and
measurement criteria as listed in Box 1. All the indicators satisfy the following three conceptual
criteria from Box 1: they are based on the distinction between use and control rights developed
above, they incorporate de facto joint as well as individual rights, and they are disaggregated by
sex of the respondent rather than of the household head. In addition, all the indicators satisfy
two measurement criteria from Box 1: they are all quantitative measures that are capable of
being collected at multiple points of time. Table 1 in Appendix 2 presents the complete list of
recommended indicators that meet all five criteria, along with quantitative formulae for
calculating them from raw data. These formulae also incorporate the above-mentioned criteria.
Table 1, Appendix 2 also provides a summary of two important findings from the
literature review discussed in detail below. First, the table notes any concerns expressed in the
literature about the empirical validity of the link between the indicator and gender equality. For
example, indicators based on group membership raise questions about the extent to which
membership translates into influence that has a bearing on gender equality. Second, the table
notes whether the recommended indicator has been used in a large-scale study and has
therefore been tested. Although all of these indicators have been used in published research,
most are found in small-scale studies that test the indicator in local contexts. Few indicators
have been tested in large-scale national or regional studies.
Our indicators do vary in the degree to which they satisfy the remaining five criteria listed
in Box 1. Only a few are based on measured value, rather than quantity, of resources. These
are self-evident from the description and formulae provided. The indicators also vary in their
degree of resource intensity, replicability, and time sensitivity. Table 2 in Appendix 2 evaluates
the indicators on each of these three additional measurement criteria. We hope that this
evaluation will help researchers develop their own subgroups of indicators based on the goals of
their study/project.
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Dashboard of indicators
Our target audience for recommendations is composed of researchers and development
practitioners involved in designing or validating agricultural innovations who need to monitor the
effect of specific changes they are introducing into an agricultural production process. These
indicators are relevant primarily for users whose main objective is not the study of gender
relations but who need evaluations of the effect of specific innovations on gender equality. With
this application in mind, the paper proposes a “dashboard” of indicators that can provide
feedback in the short term to ensure that innovators are alerted if gender gaps seem to worsen.
The dashboard of indicators presented in Table 5 is a subset selected from the full menu
in Tables 3 and 4 on the basis of (a) sensitivity to change in the short run and (b) data already in
existence or, if not, that can be collected by adding questions to existing surveys. The
dashboard is intended to make it easy for innovators to re-evaluate the design and
implementation of an intervention in an agricultural production process that is in progress and
while there is still time to self-correct before final impacts can be measured or even achieved.
This classification shows that, even when we aim to provide a subset of indicators that
can be easily used for monitoring changes in gender gaps, there is no quick way to go about
this. Table 5 highlights that no data are already available in existing large-scale studies for timesensitive indicators related to crucial gender gaps in land and livestock. There are ongoing
efforts to add these to existing international surveys, but at this point they require primary data
collection.
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Table 5. Dashboard of time-sensitive indicators for which there is an existing data
collection instrument
Data already
available

Data can be
constructed
using
existing data
collection
instrument

Data
provide
short-term
time
sensitivity

The average sale value of the land owned by women
compared with that owned by men,

No

GAGP

Yes

Proportions of women and men participating in
decisions about the agricultural use of land

No

FAO, GAGP,
WEAI

Yes

No

WEAI, GAGP

Yes

No

WEAI

Yes

Proportions of women and men able to access
water/firewood/fodder/fish to the desired degree

No

Yes

Number of hours (per week, per person) for women
and for men in the household, spent on collecting
water/firewood/fodder/fish (not disaggregated)

Yes

WWAP is
developing
indicators for
water
National
time-use
studies, UN
Statistics
Division

FINDEX

FINDEX

Yes

FINDEX

FINDEX

Yes

World
Development
Indicators
World
Development
Indicators
National
time-use
surveys

Yes

Yes

YES

Yes

DHS

Yes

Yes

Land

Livestock
Proportions of women and men who own livestock
(preferably by livestock type, for example: poultry,
sheep and goats, cattle)
Livestock: proportions of women and men participating
in decisions about sale or slaughter of livestock

Water and forest

Yes

Finance
Proportions of women and men who saved money in
the last 12 months through a formal or informal
institution (i.e., not "under the pillow")
Proportions of women and men who received a loan
in the last 12 months from a formal or informal
institution

Labor
Female labor force participation rate and male rate in
agriculture (denominator, size of agricultural labor
force)
Female paid labor force participation rate and male
rate in agriculture (denominator, size of agricultural
labor force)
Average hours of leisure for women and for men or
proportions of women and men who report
inadequate leisure time

Income
Proportions of women and men who participate in
decisions to purchase daily goods
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Literature Review and Discussion of Recommended Indicators
Resource type: land and livestock
As the most significant immovable asset that households in agricultural regions own,
land has both material and symbolic importance, connecting landholders to a source of
livelihood as well as to their lineage and culture. There is now a small but significant body of
literature that addresses gendered patterns in ownership and, to a lesser extent, control over
land. The relatively extensive literature on ownership of land in particular means that we include
a separate section on indicators of ownership in the case of this resource.
Little work exists on what we term “use rights” (entry and withdrawal rights) in land.
However, indicators of labor use, including those based on time-use studies, can give us a good
sense of the extent to which women and men are physically accessing land and livestock and
withdrawing output. We turn to these indicators of labor use later in the paper. Here, we add
some indicators of decision-making about the output from the resource, an important aspect of
withdrawal rights not revealed by patterns of labor use.
Access to land may be a requirement for participation in agricultural technology
interventions. Such interventions have a direct impact on the value of land, which is often the
most valuable asset rural households own. There is thus a very high likelihood that a genderblind implementation of agricultural programs may serve to further widen intra-household wealth
inequalities between men and women. The collection of data on the intra-household distribution
of land must therefore be a part of any effort to track the gendered impact of an agricultural
intervention.
In areas of water and land scarcity and/or inequality, livestock take on special
importance as household assets that generate income, enhance food security, and serve as
insurance in case of an income shock (Peterman et al 2014). Women are often responsible for
the maintenance of livestock, particularly those housed close to the homestead such as poultry
and vulnerable animals (such as those that are sick or injured), along with the processing of
dairy products (FAO 2010). However, women are less likely than men to own livestock,
particularly larger, more valuable livestock.
Agricultural R&D agencies are extensively involved in livestock breeding innovations in
part because ownership of livestock is a way to raise income and improve nutritional outcomes
for poor, landless households in arid regions (Njuki and Sanginga 2013). Indeed, given the
entrenched patterns of land inheritance, livestock may actually prove to be easier for women to
own and control than land (FAO 2010).
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Box 2. Recommended indicators for gender gaps related to ownership, use, and control
over land and livestock
Indicators of ownership:
Land:
 The proportion of women and the proportion of men who own land (solely or jointly, self-reported)



The average area of land owned by women, same indicator for men
The average potential sale value of the land owned by women, same indicator for men

Livestock:
 The proportion of women who own livestock, same indicator for men



The average Total Livestock Units owned by women, same indicator for men
The average potential sale value of livestock owned by women, same indicator for men

Indicators of use rights:
Land:


The proportion of women who participate (solely or jointly) in decisions about the use of crops
(sale versus own consumption), same indicator for men

Livestock




The proportion of women who participate (solely or jointly) in decisions about the use of daily
livestock produce (such as milk, eggs), same indicator for men
The proportion of women who participate (solely or jointly) in decisions about the use of meat
(when livestock are slaughtered), same indicator for men

Indicators of control rights:
Land:



The proportion of women participating (solely or jointly) in decisions about the “agricultural use of
land”, same indicator for men
The proportion of women participating (solely or jointly) in decisions about
- crop choice
- choice of inputs
- timing of cropping
- sale or transfer of land
(for at least one crop or plot if there are multiple crops or plots).
Same indicator for men

Livestock:
 The proportion of women participating (solely or jointly) in decisions about sale, transfer, or
slaughter of livestock, same indicator for men

Indicators of ownership of land
Across the world, a growing body of literature shows that women are less likely than
male members of their households to own land and even less likely to own high-quality land
(Deere and Doss 2006). The feminist literature on gender and land rights, pioneered by the
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work of Agarwal (1994) and Deere (Deere and León 2001), suggested that women’s ability to
own land may improve their bargaining power within the household while also expanding their
livelihood opportunities more generally. A number of recent studies have attempted to test this
hypothesis using small data samples.
Doss et al (2015) lay out some of the widely used indicators of gender asset gaps in land
ownership for Africa. The most common measure reported in their review of studies on women
and land ownership in Africa is the proportion of women/men who self-report owning land jointly
or individually. Reviews of studies of gender and land rights for Asia and Latin America also
show that this is the most common indicator used (Kieran et al 2015, Deere et al 2012).
These reviews all note the paucity of nationally representative data on even this
“incidence” indicator. Although the DHS does ask about the incidence of land ownership, it does
so for only one woman of reproductive age per household. The LSMS provides a more
complete listing of both whether and how much land is owned by each household member.
Doss et al (2015) also point out that, in most of the studies they reviewed, the term
ownership was used when the survey actually asked about the landholder/manager. As
discussed below, we treat land management as an aspect of control rights and urge greater
attention to the difference between these terms. Deere et al (2012) point out other discrepancies
in the country-level surveys in Latin America that make generalization across countries difficult.
For example, in some countries, questions were asked only about the ownership of titled land,
which is a subset of all owned land. Furthermore, only in two countries were respondents asked
about joint ownership of land, which is often the most common form of land ownership for
women.
Some recent studies do pay careful attention to these issues. Deere et al (2013) use
incidence measures to describe the extent of the gender asset gap in Ecuador, Ghana, and
Karnataka (India), as do the ICRW GLAS studies in South Africa (Jacobs et al 2011) and
Uganda (Kes et al 2011). The ICRW studies find that women are more likely to state that they
own land jointly rather than solely and furthermore that gender asset gaps are greater within
dual-headed households than between female-headed and male-headed households. Another
significant finding is that the woman’s familial situation is extremely important, with age and
relationship to the head affecting the likelihood of owning land. For example, in the South
African sample, women who were married to the household head were better off in terms of
land ownership than wives or partners of other men in the household. The authors thus call for
more gender-disaggregated data collection on land ownership within dual-headed households.
Overall, whether a woman owns land (solely as well as jointly) appears to affect the wellbeing of the women and their households. Savath et al (2014) find that higher proportions of
female ownership of land are associated with more food-secure livelihood combinations being
pursued by households in Odisha, India. Panda and Agarwal (2005) find that female ownership
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of land or a home significantly reduces the likelihood that the woman experiences domestic
violence. In a study based on primary data from the Philippines, Estudillo et al (2001) show that
the mother’s ownership of land has a positive effect on the amount of schooling daughters (as
compared with sons) receive as well as on the amount of land bequeathed to daughters (as
compared with sons). Allendorf (2007) uses DHS data on whether a woman owns land solely or
jointly to show that women’s ownership of land has a positive statistically significant effect on
their ability to participate in joint decision-making about their own mobility and healthcare as well
as household expenditure.6 Menon et al (2013) show for Vietnam that women’s sole ownership
of land has beneficial effects on household poverty, household expenditure, and the selfemployment of women, while women’s joint ownership has a statistically significant impact only
on the former. The ability to differentiate between sole and joint ownership can thus be
insightful.
Another body of literature tests the impact of female land ownership on farm productivity.
Female land ownership is found to decrease productivity in the aggregate (Dimova and Gang
2013) but studies that control for lower female access to complementary labor and capital inputs
find that this productivity gap is eliminated or shrinks substantially (Udry et al 1995, Peterman et
al 2014, de Brauw 2015, Kilic et al 2015, Aguilar et al 2014, Oseni et al 2015).
We therefore recommend the more widespread collection of the basic land ownership
incidence measure described above, with the caveat that ownership may mean different things
in different contexts. The proportion of men and women who own land meets our conceptual
and logistical criteria and has been empirically tested in multiple contexts.
We also recommend the collection of data on the value of land owned by women and by
men. This indicator has limitations in that it is conditional upon land ownership as well as upon
the existence of a robust measure of monetary value. Nevertheless, the likelihood that such an
indicator may be more sensitive to changes in technology in the short to medium run makes it a
potentially useful indicator.
Doss at al (2015) note that data on the value or even the area of land owned were rarely
collected in the studies they reviewed, although the LSMS-ISA does collect some such data. At
present, the research that is emerging from the Gender Asset Gap Project (GAGP) for Ecuador,
Ghana, and Karnataka appears to be the most systematic attempt to construct and analyze a
sex-disaggregated measure of land value (Deere et al 2013, Swaminathan et al 2012, Doss et
al 2013). The surveys administered as part of the GAGP collected information on the size of
land owned by each member of the principal couple as well as two different valuation measures:
rental value and current sale value. Valuation questions raised issues of the inaccuracies of

She also finds that women’s land ownership increased child nutrition outcomes, most likely as a result of what she
assumes to be the “larger income and resources that women’s land rights provide” (Allendorf 2007, 10). Notably, this
last assumption is not necessarily borne out in the literature below on productivity.
6
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respondents, of disagreements among respondents, and missing values where rental or sale
markets did not exist. Nevertheless, the authors conclude that valuation data play a significant
role in any study of gender and asset inequality since asset wealth gaps may not always
correspond to asset incidence gaps. The authors also show that the current sale value of land
may be the most generalizable measure of land value given the complexity and variation in
rental contract structures in different regions and countries. As noted earlier, agricultural
interventions are much more likely to directly affect wealth gaps than incidence gaps in the short
to medium term and thus such data, although resource intensive to collect, are likely to be much
more useful than incidence data alone.

Indicators of ownership of livestock
Significant gender gaps exist in livestock ownership, with women less likely to own
larger livestock, in part because of a lack of capital (Taj et al 2012, Ayoade et al 2009, Oladele
and Monkhei 2008). Poultry appear to be the most common form of livestock owned by women,
with goats and sheep less frequently reported as being owned by women (Njuki and Mburu
2013, Kabeer and Tran 2000). There is some evidence that the increased involvement of rural
men in nonagricultural activities has increased the role women play in small-scale livestock
production (Farinde and Ajayi 2005). On the other hand, as with other assets, increases in the
value of livestock or livestock products and shifts toward large-scale production often mean that
women lose control over the asset (FAO 2010). Agricultural interventions can more easily shift
the incidence of livestock ownership than of land ownership Quisumbing and Kumar 2011) so
incidence indicators of livestock ownership are likely to be more sensitive than indicators of land
ownership.
The simplest indicator we recommend is thus the gendered incidence of livestock
ownership (sole and joint), without specifying the kind of livestock owned. This is the approach
taken by the WEAI. However, although more resource intensive, data by type of livestock can
be more revealing of gender gaps. We thus recommend a second indicator that aggregates
across ownership of various kinds of livestock using the FAO’s system of Total Livestock Units
(TLU) (Njuki et al 2013).
In terms of how the data are collected, Njuki and Mburu (2013) ask both members of the
principal couple in dual-headed household to list the type and quantity of livestock that they own
solely or jointly. Since we recommend interviewing one member of a household, we follow the
GAGP in suggesting that the interviewee be asked to construct a household-level inventory of
all assets, including all livestock, and then be asked the identity of the owner or owners of each
(Doss et al 2013).
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The current market value of livestock could be used to generate wealth gaps in livestock
(Quisumbing and Kumar 2011). Njuki and Mburu (2013) use this approach and find that,
although a small proportion of women own cattle, the high value of cattle means that cattle
ownership comprises the most significant proportion of the value of women’s livestock.

Indicators of use rights over land and livestock
As discussed earlier, the female (or male) labor force participation rate in agriculture, an
indicator of labor use, could be a useful indicator of access to over land and livestock. We
elaborate further on this as a possible indicator later in the paper. Insofar as withdrawal rights
are an important aspect of use rights, the key question is whether women and men have
decision-making rights over the output withdrawn from land and livestock. Although this is a
question that the literature often folds into the discussion of control rights, we separate out entry
and withdrawal indicators for the sake of conceptual clarity.
Thus, our list of recommended indicators includes the proportion of women who report
sole or joint participation in decision-making about the use of land for crops (sale or own-use). In
the case of livestock, we distinguish between daily output from livestock (milk, eggs), which
women do appear to have more say in, as opposed to meat from the slaughter of livestock,
which women appear to have less control over (FAO 2010).

Indicators of control rights over land and livestock
In this paper, control over land and livestock is understood to refer to participation in the
management of the asset and decision-making about the use and distribution of output. In a
somewhat unusual situation, gender-disaggregated data for at least one measure of land
management – the principal landholder or agricultural decision-maker – are more likely to be
available at the nationally representative level than a measure of land ownership. The FAO
gender and land rights database has aggregated data on the share of landholders who are
women from national agricultural censuses for 84 countries.
The FAO notes that this measure is flawed in that multiple plots are aggregated under a
single holding, thus masking the gendered distribution of farming responsibilities at the plot
level. Furthermore, the censuses report a single farm holder, often corresponding to the male
household head, although women may be involved in many significant aspects of farm
management. The World program for the Census of Agriculture (WCA) has recognized this
problem and, as of 2010, has modified its definition to include a “joint holder” (FAO 2005). It is
not clear to what extent these new guidelines are being followed by member countries.
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While the WCA thus provides some limited and imperfect data, to be consistent with our
conceptual criteria, we recommend a related but slightly different indicator: the share of women
who report being the primary decision-maker (solely as well as jointly) with respect to
agricultural use of land. Thus, while using a similar definition of landholder, our measure has a
different denominator (all women) from that of the WCA database (denominator, all
landholders).
De Brauw et al (2008) create an indicator of managerial control for land in China, which
also includes a more specific question on control over the income generated by the farm and/or
over processes such as marketing that generate most of the income. Here, we distinguish
between control over land and control over income, thus separating these two categories.
Understanding decision-making about land, as separate from control over income, will aid the
design of more effective and gender-equitable agricultural interventions.
Of course, the WCA definition is quite broad, as “management control” over the
agricultural holding can incorporate several different issues. The LSMS creates three categories
of agricultural decision-making: decisions about (a) crop choice, (b) input use, and (c) the timing
of cropping. Although some LSMS ask questions about decision-making for each crop and each
subactivity within these three categories, this broader three-part frame may be one that is
reasonably concise but could nevertheless capture some more subtle changes in female and
male management rights. We thus recommend a second, more nuanced, indicator of control
over land that is disaggregated into these three categories, as well as a fourth important
category of decisions about the sale/transfer of land.
Dimova and Gang (2013) use crop-disaggregated LSMS data for Malawi and find that
female land ownership increases the likelihood that women participate in decisions about cashcropping, which is associated with larger streams of income in Malawi. de Brauw (2015) uses
simply the ability to choose the crop (solely or jointly) as a measure of female management
rights over agricultural land. He uses plot- and crop-level data based on a small sample
household survey in northern Mozambique to show that women make these decisions in only
70% of the cases in which they own the land and that the primary determinant of women’s
ability to make these decisions is an indicator that the man was involved in off-farm work. Thus,
effective management of land by women, he argues, is enhanced but not guaranteed by female
ownership of land. Although his results differ from those of Dimova and Gang (2013), in both
cases sex-disaggregated data on decision-making in agricultural production turn out to be
useful.
We follow a similar format for livestock, asking about participation in decision-making
about the sale, transfer, or slaughter of the livestock as an indicator of “control” over the
resource (Njuki and Mburu 2013).

29

CGIAR Gender and Agriculture Network

Working Paper No.1

June 2016

Resource type: water and forest common pool resources
Common pool resources (CPRs) are a vital source of food, fodder, fuel, firewood, and
water for agricultural households, particularly for poorer and landless ones (Beck and Nesmith
2001). Understanding the full income impacts of any policy or technology change in rural
communities thus requires an understanding of its impacts on the use and control of common
pool resources. A growing body of research is calling attention to the gendering of CPR use and
arguing that increasing women’s ability to access and control the use of CPRs is not only central
to ensuring gender equality in these communities, but can also improve the conservation and
management of such resources (Agarwal 2010a, Khosla and Pearl 2003).
To the extent that these are common pool resources, an understanding of who controls
the use of these resources requires identifying the institutions of CPR management at the
community level in each context and developing indicators that appropriately address the extent
to which women and men are able to influence those decisions. The increased advocacy and
prevalence of user groups to manage common pool resources means that recent studies of
gendered access to common property resources investigate the extent to which the “descriptive
representation of women in (user) groups can lead to substantive representation” (Meinzen-Dick
and Zwarteveen 2001). This raises methodological issues for us, as our primary goal is to
recommend indicators that can be developed using population sampling methods such as those
employed by national household surveys, the LSMS, the WEAI, and so on. As we see in
Appendix 1, the indicators of control that are used in the CPR literature are based on the
sampling of groups. We instead propose versions of these indicators based on population
samples.
This section focuses in particular on access to forest and water resources. Forest
resources provide firewood and fodder as well as access to fruits, herbs, and vegetables that
grow in the wild, whose collection is the responsibility of women and girls in most societies.
These forest products serve as key inputs into the production of food, again the responsibility of
women worldwide. Any degradation in the quantity or quality of these resources thus affects
women’s time and income poverty.
Access to water is equally central to a host of tasks that are defined as the responsibility
of women, within and outside the household (Zwarteveen 1997, Khosla and Pearl 2003). Here,
too, water-use technologies developed primarily for agriculture (for example, large-scale
irrigation projects that involve the diversion and consolidation of water bodies or tube wells that
reduce the groundwater available for drinking wells) can negatively affect women’s ability to
access and use water for their needs (Crow and Sultana 2002). Sex-disaggregated indicators
that capture changes in women’s/men’s ability to access water are thus crucial to evaluating the
full impact of such projects on well-being.
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The impact of technological innovations on common pool resources is likely to be
significant. Changes in seed type and increases in the value of crops, for example, can change
patterns of land and water use and thus claims upon water and forest lands. As agricultural land
has expanded, land once defined as common use has become increasingly privatized or
controlled by the state, thus affecting women’s ability to gather firewood and water and thus
their time and income poverty (Beck and Nesmith 2001).
Given the extent to which poor households depend on common pool resources for fuel,
food, and water needs and the extent to which women use these CPRs, any analysis of the
impact of agricultural interventions must include their impact on common property resources.
In seeking to identify such indicators, our work overlaps with that of the World Water
Assessment Program (WWAP), which is in the process of developing a set of international
indicators for gendered access to water (WWAP 2014). To enable coordination between these
efforts, we suggest employing some of those indicators for other common property resources as
well.
Box 3. Recommended indicators for gender gaps related to use and control over water
and forest common pool resources
Indicators of use



The proportion of women able to access water/firewood/fodder to the desired degree, same
indicator for men
Average number of hours (per week, per woman, per man in the household) spent in collecting
water, firewood and fodder

Indicators of control over decision-making




The proportion of women and men who are members of a water or forest user group
The proportion of women and men who report attending water or forest user group meetings
(conditional upon group membership)
The proportion of women and men who report speaking at meetings of the forest/water user
group (conditional upon group membership)

Indicators of use rights over forests and water
Forest resources
Women’s use of forest resources differs from men’s use in terms of the kinds of forest
products they are likely to access. Women are more likely to access berries, fruits, fodder, and
firewood and men are more likely to access timber (Agarwal 1997, Mwangi and Mai 2011). This
difference also means a difference in the timing of use. Women’s needs, while causing less
large-scale damage to the forest, are ongoing throughout the year. Male logging of timber, on
the other hand, can be concentrated in time, occurring a few times in a year. Attempts to
manage forest resources by restricting use to certain periods of time can thus have disparate
impacts on men and women, making it harder for women to use forest resources than for men.
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The most comprehensive work on gender and forest use and conservation is Bina
Agarwal’s study of 135 forest user groups in India and Nepal, compiled in the book Gender and
Green Governance (2010a). As part of the study, Agarwal asks respondents whether they
experience a shortage of firewood, fodder, timber, fish, and wild fruits and vegetables.
A modified indicator, which we recommend, would be the proportion of women/men who
are able to access forest resources to the extent necessary. If asked of both men and women,
this would be a subjective indicator of gendered gaps in access to these resources. Answers to
these questions would of course vary by class, caste, and race within the same
geographic/ecological region, so surveyors would have to be careful about their sampling frame.
A more objective but also more resource-intensive indicator would be the average
amount of time spent per week per woman in the household to collect the desired amount of
each resource versus the average amount of time spent per week per man in the household.
We recommend this indicator despite its resource intensity because, as discussed later, timeuse studies are essential to understanding time poverty. Furthermore, the collection of time-use
data by the WEAI and some national survey agencies may imply that such an indicator will
become easier to construct in the future.

Water resources
In order to capture actual use, the WWAP review also suggests an indicator on “the
ability to access water to the desired degree.” This would be an extremely important question to
ask women and men in households to evaluate the “full income” impact of agricultural
interventions. As in the case of forest resources, a time-use module would provide a more
objective answer to this question by helping understand gendered differences in the average
hours spent to access water and fuel.

Indicators of control rights over forests and water
As we shall see, the few studies that attempt to look at gendered control over forests
and water rely on sampling and observation of user groups (Mwangi and Mai 2011). Our goal,
on the other hand, is to find indicators that can be based on national household surveys that
sample individuals. What we recommend is therefore a question asking women and men if they
are members of forest or water user groups. The weakness of this indicator is that mere
membership in the user group does not translate into effective control over resource
management outcomes (Nightingale 2002). To attempt to get at more substantive participation,
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we also recommend indicators based on asking women and men if they attend forest and user
group meetings, as well as if they have spoken at forest and user group meetings.7
Indicators based on membership, attendance, and voice in user groups are clearly
limited in terms of their replicability across context given that forested areas are likely to have
more forest user groups than the plains, and that the prevalence of user groups of any kind is
likely to vary significantly depending upon the local political economy. These indicators are
merely a first step toward measuring gendered gaps in common pool resources and we urge
further research into these issues.

Resource type: financial assets
A very important consequence of women’s lack of property rights and limited
participation in paid work is an inability to acquire and accumulate financial assets, including
checking and savings accounts in banks and other financial institutions as well as access to
credit and insurance instruments that depend on proof of repayment via income streams or
collateral, both of which women lack.
Although women’s exclusion from large, formal financial institutions is well documented,
so is the existence of women-only “chit funds,” ROSCAs, or savings groups across the world,
some of which are now regulated by the government and thus “formalized” (Collins et al 2009).
The existence of such institutions globally suggests a less visible women’s history of
engagement and comfort with financial transactions and an understanding of the importance of
access to savings and credit. Indeed, in some countries, women’s involvement in informal
financial institutions is greater than men’s (Johnson and Nino-Zarazua 2011, Demigurc-Kunt
and Klapper 2013). However, although being more flexible and clearly more inclusive of the
poor, smaller microfinance institutions often provide relatively more expensive credit/lower
returns on savings, thus limiting members’ ability to use financial instruments to increase
savings, investment, and household income (Claessens 2006). Dupas and Robinson (2009) find
that women small entrepreneurs in Kenya extensively used non-interest-bearing savings
accounts even though they had high withdrawal fees (provided to them in a randomized control
trial), indicating negative rates of return on their informal savings instruments and high latent
demand for access to formal bank accounts.
Despite an expansion of microfinance agencies targeting women, women’s access to
savings and credit remains extremely limited in rural, developing-world contexts (Mayoux and
Hartl 2009). Microfinance groups have not been able to build the long-lasting linkages to larger
financial institutions necessary to scale up their access to funds and grow independently of

7

These mirror questions asked of group members by Agarwal in her 2010 study, as well as questions that the
WWAP is hoping to collect data on for water user group members.
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nongovernment and aid organizations (Cull et al 2009). Meanwhile, commercial financial
institutions (FIs), both public and private, seem to act in ways that further reinforce legal and
social biases against women rather than undermining them (Demigurc-Kunt et al 2013).
The long-term success of agricultural interventions rests on sustainable access to credit,
which, if gendered, inevitably results in gendered patterns of participation in the agricultural
interventions. This can generate a vicious circle in which participation in innovation programs
increases assets and income in a gender unequal way, thus further reducing the likelihood of
female participation in future programs. One important early indicator of gendered impact is thus
likely to show up in women’s and men’s patterns of savings and credit.
The recent publication of the 2011 and 2014 Findex surveys means that sexdisaggregated data on the use of financial assets are now available across a three-year period
nationally for 148 countries. When possible, we therefore recommend indicators that the Findex
collects to minimize the resource intensity of data collection. Indeed, in comparison to the
paucity of gendered data on other kinds of resources, this survey provides us with a wealth of
internationally comparable sex-disaggregated data on basic measures of financial use. We
hope that funding for the Findex survey will remain robust and that the survey will continue to
serve as an example of the kind of gendered data collection that we seek. It should be noted
that the Findex survey assumes that registered microfinance organizations are formal financial
institutions. In some countries, however, a significant proportion of microfinance organizations
may not be formal in this sense (Grown et al 2015).
Box 4. Recommended indicators for gender gaps related to use and control over
financial assets
Use


The proportion of women banked (individually or jointly) at a formal sector institution, same
indicator for men



The proportion of women who are members of a microfinance/ROSCA group, same indicator
for men
The average duration for which women have participated in a group-based formal/informal
financial institution, same indicator for men




The proportion of women who have saved money in the last 12 months through a formal or
informal financial institution, same indicator for men



The proportion of women who have received a loan in the last 12 months from a formal or
informal financial institution, same indicator for men

Control


The proportion of women who (solely or jointly) decided how to use the loan amounts, same
indicator for men



Conditional upon asset use of the loan, the proportion of women who acquired an ownership
(solely or jointly) stake in the asset, same indicator for men



The proportion of women responsible for repayment of the loan (conditional upon loan receipt),
same indicator for men
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Indicators of use rights over financial assets
Access to large, commercial financial institutions (FIs) remains the goal of most projects
that seek to expand financial inclusion. Ultimately, commercial FIs provide most savers and
borrowers with larger and cheaper loans and offer them a wide variety of vehicles for savings
that are safer and have higher returns (Vonderlack and Schreiner 2002). As Johnson (2004)
points out, although the lack of participation in commercial FIs could be voluntary, given the
clear cost advantages of FI financial products and the extent to which the poor participate in
informal institutions (Collins et al 2009), it is widely accepted that the financial exclusion of
women and the poor in developing countries is more likely involuntary. Given that the use of
commercial FIs begins with the opening of a checking or savings account at a bank or credit
union, the proportion of women and men who are banked (i.e., hold a bank account in a post
office, bank, or credit union) is widely used as an indicator of financial use (Claessens 2006).
The Findex survey asks respondents whether they hold accounts solely and jointly in a
bank or other type of financial institution. This is the same indicator we recommend, with the
additional recommendation that sole and joint data be collected separately so that a
disaggregated analysis can be performed if useful. According to Findex data, the gender gap in
the proportion of women banked is considerably higher in developing countries, and in rural
areas. The gender gap in the proportion of men and women banked ranges from 6 to 9
percentage points across the sample. Although the “lack of money to open an account” was the
most common reason for being unbanked in the sample as a whole, the second most common
reason that women provided was that a “family member already has an account” (DemigurcKunt and Klapper 2013).
As far as access to credit goes, the Findex asks whether the respondent has borrowed
money “from any source in the past year” and then disaggregates by kind of source (bank,
informal lender, family, etc.) and purpose of the loan. Here, we recommend the question on
borrowing in the last year from formal and informal institutions (as opposed to family) as a first
look at gendered access to credit. The Findex includes a similarly structured measure of
savings: whether the respondent saved any money in the last 12 months and the savings
vehicle used. We recommend a savings measure that focuses on savings through formal and
informal institutions (as opposed to money saved “under the pillow”).
The Gender Asset Gap Project recently published an analysis of its data on borrowing
(Grown et al 2015). This is a richer data set in that information on both members of the principal
couple in a household is available and this includes information on the purpose of the loan. The
authors find that women have less debt for asset accumulation than men, and that the mean
value of asset debt held by women is lower. They also find that ownership of assets is positively
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correlated with taking out asset loans, for both men and women. Thus, inequalities in asset
ownership tend to perpetuate themselves.
The receipt of a loan on its own is, however, an ambiguous measure of well-being as it
could indicate the existence of debt spiral and so may require information on the purpose and
source of the loan (Mayoux and Hartl 2009). Grown et al (2015) find, for example, that wealthier
households are more likely to hold asset debt, which leads to greater wealth in the future, while
poorer households hold expense debt, more likely a sign of a debt spiral. Since Findex data on
the purpose of the loan are available, researchers may be able to investigate the gendered use
of different kinds of credit.
The size of savings accumulated by women and men and the size of loans received by
each are also possible indicators of use. These last two indicators are somewhat more difficult
to collect and, as with all wealth data, more prone to errors and/or disagreements among the
members of the household. Within the Findex, questions on the amount of money saved or in
checking accounts are conspicuous by their absence because of the sensitivity of such
questions. However, Grown et al (2015) do collect and analyze these data. Some national
household surveys such as the Indian NSS do collect data on quantity and source of loans at
the household level and perhaps need to be urged to ask in whose name the loan was taken
out. We mark this as a possibility for the future given our belief that wealth indicators can be
more sensitive than incidence indicators.
We also flag, without recommending, another indicator used in the U.S. Survey of
Consumer Finance (SCF) but not in the Findex: the proportion of women or men who report
being denied a loan in the last five years. This may be helpful in understanding the extent to
which women are being denied credit at a higher rate. However, those who are likely to be
denied are also less likely to ask for a loan, making us hesitant to recommend this indicator.
There is a much larger literature on gendered access to group-based financial
institutions. Particularly among rural women, participation in a microfinance group/organization
is used as an indicator of access to credit in several studies (Johnson 2004, Johnson and NinoZarazua 2011). Other studies use the gender of a microloan recipient (as opposed to just
membership in a microfinance group) as an indicator of an increase in financial access (Pitt and
Khandker 1998, Hashemi et al 1996, Holvoet 2005). Although the Findex does not ask this
question, we recommend a survey question asking women and men whether they are members
of a ROSCA (rotating savings and credit association)/microcredit group.
Merely holding an account or being a member of a chit fund does not, however,
necessarily translate into higher savings and credit activity. An alternative indicator on the
duration of membership in a microfinance/informal financial institution has been used to add
more nuance to an indicator of use. Garikipati (2008) uses a categorical variable with 0 = not a
member, 1 = member for three years or less, 2 = member for between 3 and 6 years, and 4 =
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member for more than 6 years. Pitt et al (2006) find that such a duration indicator is highly
correlated with loan size. Where group participation is of interest, we suggest that this may thus
be a richer indicator of use for membership-based financial institutions.

Indicators of control rights over financial assets
Although participation in financial institutions can increase women’s ability to use credit
and savings vehicles, the question of whether they effectively control the allocation of these
funds within the household and thus the distribution of benefits remains in doubt. Some studies
suggest that group membership can be especially important in translating participation in
microfinance into effective control by women (Bali Swain and Wallentin 2007, Holvoet 2005).
The literature also suggests that, when female access to financial assets does not result in
increased female ownership of productive assets and increased female streams of income,
female-male empowerment gaps can actually worsen (Mayoux and Hartl 2009, Garikipati 2008).
The ongoing debate over this issue has, however, brought about several possible ways
of measuring the extent of control over credit. In one of the earliest systematic studies of this
issue, Goetz and Sengupta (1996) use a dual indicator that combines knowledge about the use
of the loan with involvement (through the contribution of labor) in the activities that the loan was
used to finance. They combine these two variables to develop a five-point index of “managerial
control” over the loan. Kabeer (2001), however, points out that this conflates the decision about
how to use the loan with the actual implementation of that decision. Given the possible
differences between male and female financial priorities, she argues for clearly separating out
the former.
Several studies ask respondents who decided how to use the loan, with answers
classified along a range from only or mostly the respondent to only or mostly another family
member. In the case of most studies, this other member is the spouse. Thus, a question about
“who decides how to use the loan/savings amount” as well as “who was responsible for
repayment of any loan” would appear to be reasonably easy to integrate into a household
survey while also fitting the conceptual need for a sex-disaggregated measure that can be
tracked over time. When a loan is taken out to purchase an asset, we recommend asking who
owns this asset (Mayoux and Hartl 2009, Garikipati 2008).
An extensive body of literature attempts to examine the gendered impact of financial
assets on outcome variables, including decision-making. Studies measure a range of outcome
variables such as the proportion of household income generated by the woman versus her
spouse (Garikipati 2008), the number of hours of employment of the woman versus her spouse,
and questions about the extent to which the woman participates in decision-making about
aspects of household expenditures (Holvoet 2005, Garikipati 2008, Ashraf et al 2010, Banerjee
et al 2015). Studies also look at non-sex-disaggregated household metrics such as expenditure
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on certain durable goods believed to be female-preferred (Ashraf et al 2010) and medical
expenditure or the years of education of children (Pitt et al 2006, Pitt and Khandker 1998) or
nutritional outcomes for children (Hazarika and Guha-Khasnobis 2008), based on the
assumption that these outcome variables correlate with women’s increased decision-making.
Even if in almost all these cases the data are not nationally representative, this body of literature
suggests that sex-disaggregated data on use and control of financial assets can be a useful
signal of gender gaps in well-being more generally.

Resource type: labor
Labor is an extremely critical input into agricultural production, a vital source of livelihood
for asset-poor households, and an important determinant of intra-household bargaining power.
This section analyzes key indicators of the impact of agricultural interventions on gender gaps
with respect to labor. Here, too, we use the framework of use and control to distinguish between
the actual allocation of women’s time and the extent to which women believe they have a say in
that allocation.

Indicators of use of labor
The traditional metric of labor force participation continues to be extensively used and
widely published in UN, World Bank, and other international studies of gender and the economy.
Several studies link female labor force participation rates to greater participation in household
decision-making as well as improved education and health outcomes for women and children. In
addition, the UN and World Bank continue to treat higher female labor force participation as a
metric of increased female empowerment (World Bank 2012, UN Women 2010).
It is important to note that the UN System of National Accounts (SNA) definition of labor
includes self-employment and paid and unpaid work in family enterprises in both informal and
formal settings, but excludes unpaid domestic work. Activities are within the economic
production boundary defined by the SNA if they comprise (a) production of goods or services
supplied, or intended to be supplied, to units other than their producers, including the production
of goods and services used up in the process of producing such goods or services (intermediate
consumption); (b) production of all goods retained by their producers for their own final use
(own-account production of goods); (c) production of housing services by owner-occupiers; and
(d) production of domestic and personal services produced by paid domestic staff (UN 2008).
National data on labor force participation currently cover only SNA work. Here, we therefore
distinguish between these two kinds of work by using the terms SNA and non-SNA work.
The debate over the U-shape in the relationship between female labor force participation
(SNA work) and GDP/capita suggests that increases in female labor force participation do not
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always correspond to improvements in household income such as those that might be expected
from agricultural innovations (Cagatay and Ozler 1995, Klasen 1999). Increased participation in
heavy farm work is not in itself desirable, as shown by more localized studies that find that
women report greater satisfaction when they withdraw from the labor force – particularly when
the work itself is arduous labor in inadequate working conditions (Agarwal 1994, Johnson et al
2015). The International Labour Organization (ILO) is currently developing a global indicator of
decent work to address these limitations of the current definition of the labor force participation
rate. Consequently, we recommend time-use studies of leisure hours to understand whether
increased labor force participation merely intensifies a “double burden” for women and men
(Floro and Mieurs 2009). We return to the issue of time-use data below.
With respect to labor force participation in agriculture, the World Development Indicators
database reports the female/male proportion of the agricultural labor force (SNA work).8 We
recommend use of the same indicator in order to make use of the World Development
Indicators database and others since this indicator is also available from most country censuses
or household surveys at the level of local administrative units. An important caveat, however, is
that these surveys are undercounting women’s economic activity by treating at least some ownfarm agricultural work as domestic or non-SNA work (Antonopoulos and Hirway 2010).
An indicator of a gender gap in the use of labor resources based on the female
proportion of the wage labor force in agriculture is desirable for several reasons. First, although
a relatively low proportion of men’s and women’s agricultural work is likely to be paid a wage in
smallholder agriculture, for asset-poor households, paid work may provide a vital source of cash
in a commercializing economy. Thus, participation in the agricultural wage labor force can be
interpreted as an indicator of access to a scarce resource ‒ cash. Second, there is reason to
expect that female participation in wage labor will be correlated with increased decision-making
over other farm household resources based on some evidence that paid work increases
women’s participation in decision-making in some contexts (Jejeebhoy 2002, Anderson and
Eswaran 2009, Deere and Twyman 2012, Twyman et al 2015). Finally, sex-disaggregated data
on individual participation are easily available in international databases.
In many countries, the relative stagnation of agriculture and the profound urban bias of
the state have resulted in a very deep problem of under-unemployment for men and women in
rural areas (Jackson and Rao 2009). One important indicator of the success or failure of
agricultural interventions would thus be a decline in the degree of under-/unemployment for men
as well as women. To the extent that domestic non-SNA work can be a residual category for
women, measures of unemployment are notoriously poor at picking up female unemployment in

8

An important difference is that the denominator for the proportion of the agricultural labor force is the total size of the
agricultural labor force, whereas, for labor force participation, the denominator is the female working-age population.
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developing countries. Thus, a direct question on self-reported under-employment may be a
useful indicator.
However, indicators of SNA-based work have their limitations. Apart from failing to value
women’s domestic work, they mask possible negative effects on leisure time. Interventions that
increase labor force participation may also decrease leisure time, thus intensifying women’s
work burdens and doing so differently for women based on ethnicity and class status (Doss
2001, Deshpande 2011, Johnson et al 2015). Time-use studies have thus emerged as among
the most significant methodological additions to the development data toolkit in the last decade
(Antonopoulos and Hirway 2010). Time-use studies are currently our best tool to measure nonSNA work. The expansion of time-use studies has come about largely as a result of pressure
from feminists arguing that women’s “double burden” makes them uniquely starved of leisure
time and that both the long-standing devaluation of women’s work and the extent of multitasking involved in much of women’s intra-household labor make conventional methods of
measuring work inadequate (Esquivel et al 2008).
Eighty-five countries have now implemented at least one national-level time-use survey
since 1990 although this list is dominated by developed countries (Antonopoulos and Hirway
2010, ICATUS 2012). Their experience suggests that these surveys do require well-trained
enumerators and are likely to be time and resource intensive. Time-use studies can vary by the
time frame tracked as well as the method used to document activities: diaries versus recall
interviews. Although 24-hour time diaries maintained by respondents are recommended by
ICATUS guidelines, several recent surveys, including the WEAI, have chosen to ask
respondents to recall their use of time over the previous 24 hours. Based on recall data, the
WEAI computes the number of hours of leisure reported by the respondents and creates an
indicator of insufficient leisure hours if they fall below 10.5 hours (per 24-hour period).
For tracking a gender gap in labor use, we recommend including an indicator based on
differences in leisure time between men and women. When possible, data for this indicator
should be obtained from a respondent survey based on recall to compute the average number
of leisure hours for the male and female members of the principal couple in a household.
Tracking increases or decreases in average leisure hours is likely to be more sensitive to shortor medium-term change than an indicator that simply asks women and men if they have
adequate leisure time or if they are satisfied with their hours of leisure. Although subject to all of
the problems with self-reported subjective assessments, this indicator will remind planners and
program managers to pay attention to the risk that an agricultural innovation can inadvertently
exacerbate problems of women’s “double-burden.”
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Box 5. Recommended indicators for gender gaps related to use and control over labor:
Use:






Female labor force participation rate in agriculture (denominator, number of people in the
agricultural labor force), same indicator for men
Female paid labor force participation rate in agriculture (denominator, number of people in the
agricultural labor force), same indicator for men
The proportion of women who report that they are underemployed. That is, employed ((selfemployed or engaged in wage work) for fewer hours than they want to be), same indicator for
men
Average hours of leisure for women or the proportion of women with inadequate leisure time,
same indicator for men

Control:


Currently, no recommended indicators.

Indicators of control over labor
Indicators of control over labor are very uncommon. Some small-scale studies of the
impact of access to financial assets on decision-making by women and men do incorporate
questions on women’s control over labor, as does the Gender Asset Gap Project. However,
although women’s control over their own and others’ labor is a crucial aspect of gender
inequality in agriculture, the existing evidence and sources of data are too scarce for a
recommendation for any specific indicators of control over labor use following the criteria used
in this analysis. We do, however, discuss some possibilities below.
One indicator with potential is an umbrella question about whether a woman can decide
how to use her time. For example, the GAGP uses the question “Do (or did) you make the
decision on whether or not to work” (Deere and Twyman 2012). Although the authors appear to
be referring to extra-household work, this could be broadened to all SNA work and framed to
ask whether the man or woman can decide solely or jointly to take up or leave work (whether
domestic, waged, salaried, or self-employment) or whether someone else decides. A query
about whether engaging in a particular type of work is “not a decision, based on norms” might
be especially useful in contexts in which a strict gender division of labor restricts women to
particular forms of household work (Holvoet 2005). Changes in the proportion of women or men
who perceive engaging in a particular type of work as a choice proportion could signal a shift in
the gender division of labor. Garikipati (2008) uses a version of this question, asking women
whether or not they wanted to change how they used their work time. At least two other studies
include a version of this question, asking if the “spouse has banned you from working outside
the home” (Pitt et al 2006, Menon et al 2013). However, when this question refers to all or any
type of work and is not agriculture-specific, the data will be “blunt” in the sense that they may
not be sensitive to changes caused by agricultural interventions.
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A different approach to measuring gender differences in control over labor would be to
ask individual women and men whether they decide solely, jointly, or not at all about how they
use their time on a task-by-task basis within the agricultural production cycle. This is resource
and time intensive. A compromise is to categorize work into agricultural own-farm work, wage
work, and (non-SNA) domestic labor and ask women and men whether they are able to decide
how to use their time among different tasks. For example, instead of administering a time-use
survey, Garikipati (2008) asks a question on whether the woman is able to share a variety of
domestic chores. This is a less resource intensive way to capture the extent of the “double
burden.” Another version of this question, used by the WEAI, is more specific to wage or
salaried work, which, as discussed earlier, is potentially more directly connected to greater
bargaining power and may also involve challenging gender norms.

Resource type: income
Women involved in agriculture have little “own” income under their sole control.
However, women almost always directly contribute to household income in an agricultural
setting whether it is through paid work or unpaid farming and livestock maintenance.9 To
capture a gender gap in control over income, it is therefore preferable to address the ways men
and women use (or decide about the use of) household income rather than focusing narrowly on
each individual’s “own” income.
Box 6. Recommended indicators for gender gaps in use and control over income




The proportion of women who participate (solely or jointly) in decisions to purchase daily
goods, same indicator for men
The proportion of women who participate (solely or jointly) in decisions to purchase major
goods, same indicator for men
The proportion of women who participate (solely or jointly) in decision-making about income
from a specific farm enterprise or off-farm employment, same indicator for men

Use and control rights over income
It is difficult to distinguish between indicators of use and indicators of control over
income by sex. This is primarily because differences between female and male uses of income
are highly dependent on context. For example, food is commonly treated as a female
expenditure and goods such as alcohol and tobacco as male expenditure (Hoddinott and
Haddad 1995, Pitt and Khandker 1998), but these are poorly verified generalizations. The use of
expenditure proportions on food or alcohol as evidence of female or male “use” of income

9

The proportion of women who farm independently of male partners is quite low in Asia and Latin America. The
proportion of women engaged in paid work in agriculture also varies significantly by region.
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should be avoided. Indicators based on sole or joint participation in decision-making about
different aspects of the use of income are preferable.
One way of measuring gender differences in control over income is to compare men’s
and women’s physical access to earnings. For example, several studies begin with questions
about physically holding onto or retaining money. Pankaj and Tankha (2010) ask whether the
woman retains any of her earnings as well as the proportion of wage earnings she hands over
to someone else in the household. Kabeer and Tran (2000) show that, in Vietnam, in 98% of
surveyed households, male earners handed over a majority of their earnings to their wives to
manage. Another way to assess control over income is to ask whether the woman or man
receives the earnings of other members to manage. Garikipati (2008) asks whether the woman
retains money from the sale of crops and the sale of livestock; Kabeer et al (2011) ask whether
the woman retains some income for own use while Jejeebhoy (2000) asks whether she receives
cash to spend as she chooses. Since this is an important aspect of control over income, we
recommend an indicator of physical control over household income that is created by asking
women and men whether they retain any part of their own earnings and/or receive any part of
the earnings of any others in the household.
However, questions about participation in decision-making about the use of household
income are more commonly used than questions about retaining own income or receiving
income from others in the household. The widely used DHS ask women whether they
participate in decision-making about daily and major household purchases (Kishor and Subaiya
2008). Other studies ask more narrowly focused questions: for example, the GAGP asks
respondents who earn money whether they make the decision on how to spend it (Deere and
Twyman 2012). This measures only the decision-making of women who report earning their
own income. Other studies use decisions about specific kinds of purchases, including food,
jewelry, consumer durables, and various items of expenditure for children (Ashraf et al 2010,
Kabeer et al 2011). The WEAI is unusual in asking about participation in decision-making based
upon the source of the income. Respondents are asked about their participation in decisionmaking about income generated from (a) food crops, (b) cash crops, (c) livestock production, (d)
nonfarm activities, and (e) wage and salary work. This specificity is important for detecting how
changing cropping and livelihood patterns affect gendered control over income but these data
are not readily available through large international surveys and collection is resource intensive.
In conclusion, for easy measurement of gender gaps in control over income, we
recommend the use of an indicator of participation in household expenditure decisions based on
the Demographic Household Surveys that ask women whether they participate in decisionmaking about daily and major household purchases. This provides a field-tested indicator of
female control over the use of household income, which is more specific than a question about
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household spending in general, and it allows researchers to use the growing database of DHS
globally.

Resource type: social capital derived from collective action
Participation in collective action that provides access to and influence over social capital
is treated as a resource for the purposes of this paper because gender gaps in this type of
social capital affect several outcomes sought by agricultural innovations. For example, access
to training and information provided through organized groups is a critical input to technology
choice and to optimal use of new technologies as well as opportunities for credit, marketing, and
small enterprise development. In addition, group participation can channel access to other
resources, including water, grazing, and forest as well as inputs such as seed and fertilizer.
Group participation can also change many of the patterns of decision-making, control, and use
within the household discussed throughout this paper. Given women’s historic confinement to
private spaces, participation in public, collective decision-making has symbolic significance but
is also extremely important for women’s practical and strategic needs (Molyneux 1985). As seen
earlier, women’s participation in water or forest user groups can shape their ability to secure
food and affect their time burdens (Agarwal 2010a). Participation in microfinance groups can
help increase access to credit and thus to assets (Mayoux and Hartl 2009). Technologies
disseminated through women’s groups can have a more significant impact on livelihood and
nutrition outcomes than those disseminated through individual male heads of households
(Kumar and Quisumbing 2011).
In the following analysis of indicators, “use” corresponds to participation in collective
action, defined minimally as being a member of one or more organized groups. Peterman et al
(2014) distinguish between group membership and political participation, and we address both
below. The notion of “control” in this context corresponds to influence over group decisionmaking. In view of our focus on gender gaps affected by agricultural innovation, we include
indicators that apply to local-, village-, or district-level collective bodies in preference to nationallevel ones. Although data for national-level political participation is readily available, it is unlikely
to be sensitive to change in gender gaps affected by agricultural innovations. However, to meet
our criteria that indicators be easily replicable and, to the extent possible, make use of existing
data, we recommend only indicators that are based on population sampling, rather than
indicators that require the sampling or observation of groups.
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Box 7. Recommended indicators of gender gaps in participation in collective action






Average number of community organizations and/or groups that women are members of, same
indicator for men
Average number of agricultural producer/farmer groups that women are members of, same
indicator for men
The proportion of women who voted (conditional on existence of elections), same indicator for
men
The proportion of women who independently decided how to vote (conditional on voting), same
indicator for men
The proportion of women who attended village council meetings, same indicator for men

Influence related to control:



The proportion of women who spoke up at community group/village council meetings, same
indicator for men
The proportion of female leaders and representatives in the village council (publicly available
data)

Indicators of participation in collective/community bodies
Membership in groups is commonly used as an indicator of participation in collective
action, although the literature makes it clear that mere membership in a group is not the same
as active participation. Various approaches are in use: for example, the WEAI simply asks
respondents whether they are members of any village-level group while the World Bank/IFPRI
(2010) study on gender and governance asked sampled heads of households in India, Ghana,
and Ethiopia how many village-level groups/collective bodies they took part in. The World
Bank/IFPRI study found mixed results in terms of gender differences in the number of groups
that male and female heads belonged to, but it did appear that female heads were less likely to
be involved in production and farmer-based groups, including agricultural cooperatives. This
finding is echoed in a number of other studies, suggesting that it is not just the number but the
kinds of groups that men and women belong to that might be an indicator of greater (or
reduced) female access to information and social networks that enable agricultural production
(Davis and Negash 2007, Godquin and Quisumbing 2008). We are especially interested in
tracking women’s participation in such producer groups. We therefore recommend both an
aggregate indicator on the number of village-level community organizations that the individual
belongs to and a sub-indicator that measures the number of agricultural/farmer-based
organizations that the individual belongs to.
As Peterman et al (2014) point out, political participation may not involve group
membership but is nevertheless an extremely important form of participation in collective
decision-making. Clearly, not all countries have democratic systems, but, where there are
established systems of universal franchise at the local level, respondents have been asked
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whether they voted and whether they made the decision of whom to vote for independently (Pitt
et al 2006, Bali Swain and Wallentin 2007, Menon et al 2013).
One could also examine the degree to which women participate in the activities of local
political bodies. As a minimal measure of this, at least three studies include in their measures of
female empowerment a question on whether respondents had attended a village-level council
meeting (Pankaj and Tankha 2010, World Bank/IFPRI 2010, Kabeer et al 2011).

Indicators of influence or control within collective bodies
Female membership in collective decision-making bodies does not necessarily translate
into influence or even voice when their participation is passive. Typically, the opinions of
marginalized groups such as women are disregarded by ruling elites. Some studies therefore
probe beyond mere membership in groups: for example, the WEAI asks respondents whether
they feel comfortable speaking up in public; other studies ask whether women and men have
actually spoken up in the course of meetings of community groups or local political bodies such
as village councils (Kabeer et al 2011). Two studies find that, when women occupy leadership
positions as a result of quotas, the groups make infrastructure investments in public goods that
more directly serve women (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Iyer et al 2012).
Concrete benefits for closing gender gaps can be expected from having more women
actually serving in positions of power. An indicator based on publically available data that does
not require a household survey and that meets our other criteria is the proportion of leaders or
representatives within a local political body who are women. We can expect an increase in
women serving as leaders in local government to be correlated with improvement in gender
gaps in agricultural credit, training, and extension.
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CONCLUSIONS
The learning and transparency goals of agricultural research agencies would both be
served by greater attention to the collection of sex-disaggregated data that can be used to track
changes in key indicators of gendered use and control of assets and decision-making. Based on
a review of the literature, this paper suggests criteria for the evaluation of such indicators and
then recommends a key set of indicators that fit many of these criteria. These indicators are
chosen to be replicable across international contexts and are sensitive to the impact of
agricultural R&D interventions without being excessively resource intensive to collect.
In the last two decades, a few international sources of sex-disaggregated data have
emerged, but they tend to cover only a few of the recommended indicators and/or a limited set
of countries. As the review found, most studies of gender in agricultural contexts continue to rely
on small data samples collected at a single point in time, so that changes cannot be tracked
over time. Too many studies continue to analyze gender at the level of the sex of the household
head (most such studies were not reviewed in this document). There is thus a pressing need to
expand the available sources of sex-disaggregated data on assets using projects such as the
Gender Asset Gap Project and the WEAI as models.
The majority of the indicators recommended in this paper do call for an expanded
household survey that samples individuals, rather than households, and includes (abbreviated)
time-use surveys. Such a survey is unlikely to be short. We also argue that wealth gaps are
likely to be more sensitive and thus useful indicators to track, even while acknowledging that
they are more complicated to measure than incidence gaps. Finally, the expectation is that data
will be collected at multiple points in time so that changes in the indicators can be captured.
The creation of such indicators will therefore require some investment in well-designed
survey instruments and well-trained enumerators. To the extent that agencies wish to address
gender inequality, however, we also believe that such an investment is vitally important. In
supporting such efforts, these agencies would be aiding their own ability to do effective, genderaware agricultural research, while also serving the larger community of development
professionals interested in reducing gender inequality.
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Appendix 1: Indicators of gendered control over common property
resources that are based on group sampling
The existing literature on gendered control over common property forest resources is
primarily based on an analysis of the proportion of women and men within forest user groups
and requires appropriate sampling of the groups themselves. The primary indicator used in this
literature is the proportion of women in forest and water user groups.
Mwangi et al (2011) and Sun et al (2011) used International Forestry Resources and
Institutions (IFRI) data on the proportion of women in forest user groups across Uganda, Kenya,
Bolivia, and Mexico to investigate the question of the impact of female participation on common
property management. In part because of prior gender inequalities in mobility, asset ownership,
and use and time-use, Mwangi et al (2011) found that female-dominated groups actually
engaged in less monitoring and were less likely to adopt forest-improving technologies than
men’s and mixed groups. Sun at al (2011) used the same indicator and found that femaledominated groups tended to participate in district-level forest decision-making to a smaller
degree. However, Sun et al (2011) also found that female-dominated groups were less
exclusionary and sanctioned members less for breaking rules.
Westermann et al (2005) divided groups into male, female, and mixed on the basis of
the proportion of female membership of groups and found that the female groups demonstrated
increased cooperation and solidarity within the group due to greater collaboration both within
and outside the group (what they call greater relational social capital), thus increasing the
capacity for self-sustaining collective action. Although the short-run impacts of women’s groups
on conventional measures of forest quality may not always be positive, there is some evidence
that the inclusion of women facilitates more rational rule-making by groups and more equal
sharing of the costs of forest conservation, possibly resulting in more effective and sustainable
groups in the long run.
The primary weakness of all these indicators is the fact that mere membership in the
user group does not translate into effective control over resource management outcomes. The
forest user groups Agarwal (2010a) studied had an executive council that drove rule-making
and enforcement. Agarwal found that a higher percentage of women in the executive councils
(ECs) of forest management groups has a statistically significant positive correlation with
various measures of forest quality, although in some cases these results are obtained only if
women’s membership within the council meets a certain threshold of between 20% and 40% of
the members. She also found that women’s effective participation could result in more rational
forest closure rules and thus more ability on the part of women to comply with those rules. In her
qualitative work, she found evidence that, when women participated more, they also helped
police the forest by providing information on violators and forming informal forest patrols.
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Agarwal (2010a) thus proposes indicators of substantive female involvement in decisionmaking about forest use, including (i) the percentage of EC meetings with no women present,
(ii) the female attendance rate, (iii) whether women speak up at EC meetings, and (iv) the
proportion of female office bearers. She finds that each of these measures of substantive
participation increases when the proportion of women in the EC increases (particularly beyond a
threshold of 33% membership). These indicators of substantive control over decision-making of
course require the careful maintenance and analysis of minutes of meetings. They are thus
more resource intensive and less easily replicable.
Water resources
As in the case of forest resources, there is a gender division in the use of water that
emerges from the gender division of labor in the household. As Zwarteveen and Meinzen-Dick
(2001) point out, the policy focus on water for agricultural use, which is usually the purview of
men, has led to the marginalization of women’s water needs. Furthermore, women’s lack of
rights to land means that even women from landed households are systematically excluded
from irrigation water user groups, in which the criterion for membership is ownership of irrigated
land. Fee-based water services can also exclude women who have less access to cash.
Meanwhile, the rapid privatization of water sources for irrigation as well as for household use
has further increased the importance of class disparities among women, with women in
households that own irrigated land more easily able to access water for household as well as
extra-household uses.
The growing literature on gender and water raises these concerns about the neglect of
women’s water needs and the consequent differential impacts on their time and income poverty,
as well as the negative health outcomes that result from the use of unsanitary water for drinking,
cooking, and cleaning. Unfortunately, there appear to be few quantitative empirical studies of
the effects of women’s control over water along the lines of those discussed for forests earlier,
although some studies document (rather than analyze) the gender division of labor in waterrelated tasks and even the extent of participation by women in water user groups (UN 2006,
Crow and Sultana 2002, Faisal and Kabir 2015).
As part of an effort to highlight these issues, the WWAP is developing five baskets of
indicators, of which two (relating to governance and income generation from water) are pertinent
to our discussion (WWAP 2014) . One relevant indicator the WWAP recommends is the
proportion of women to men in water user groups. For forests, these are data that the IFRI is
already collecting; for water, these are data that the WWAP intends to collect. It is conceivable
then that a coordinated effort on this particular piece of data may be able to cover a fairly large
number of countries.
The WWAP also suggests indicators that address substantive participation by women in
such groups. In particular, it proposes an indicator that measures the “ratio of contributions in
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decision-making meetings by women and men, and the percentage of decisions adopted from
women’s contributions in meetings.” Although extremely valuable information, this is likely to
require close monitoring of group meetings and to be quite expensive to collect. As discussed in
the case of forest resources, a simpler but more subjective piece of information would be to
track the proportion of women (versus men) who reported speaking in meetings of the group
(conditional upon participation in user groups). Of course, as with participation in forest groups,
participation by women in water user groups does not always result in decisions that fully
consider women’s needs and interests (Khosla and Pearl 2003, Cleaver and Hamada 2010).
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Appendix 2: Tables
Table 1: List of indicators with formulae and findings from the literature review
Indicator

Formula

Caveats in
the literature
about the
link to
gender
equality

Existence of
large-scale
empirical studies
using the
indicator (as well
as small-scale
studies)

# of women who own land/
# of women in the sample
population;
# of men who own land/ # of
men in the sample
population
Total land area owned by
women/ # of land-owning
women;
total land area owned by
men/ # of land-owning men
Total land value owned by
women/# of land-owning
women;
total land value owned by
men/# of land-owning men

None

Yes

# of women who
participate/# of women in
sample population;
# of men who participate/#
of men in sample population

None

Land
Ownership
Proportion of women and
proportion of men who own land

The average area of land owned
by women and by men

The average sale value of the
land owned by women and by
men

Use
Proportion of women and of men
who participate in decisionmaking whether to sell or
consume crops

Control
Proportion of women and of men
participating in decisions about
the agricultural use of land:
(a) crop choice, (b) choice of
inputs, (c) timing of cropping, (d)
sale/transfer of land

For each decision:
# of women who
participate/# of women in
sample population;
# of men who participate/#
of men in sample population

59

None

None

None

Yes

Table 1 contd: List of indicators with formulae and findings from the literature review

Indicator

Formula

Caveats
in
the literature
about the link
to
gender
equality

Existence of largescale
empirical
studies using the
indicator (as well as
small-scale
studies)

Yes

Livestock
Ownership
The proportion of women and
the proportion of men who own
livestock (preferably by livestock
type, for example: poultry, sheep
and goats, cattle)

# of women who own
livestock/# of women in
sample population;
# of men who own
livestock/# of men in sample
population

None

The average TLU owned by
women and by men

TLU owned by women/# of
livestock-owning women;
TLU owned by men /# of
livestock-owning men

None

For each decision:

None

Use
The proportion of women and
the proportion of men who
participate in decisions about the
use of dairy products from
livestock (eggs, milk, etc.)
The proportion of women and
the proportion of men who
participate in decisions about the
use of meat (when livestock are
slaughtered)
Control
Livestock: Proportion of women
and the proportion of men
participating in decisions about
the sale or slaughter of livestock

# of women who
participate/# of livestock
owning women;
# of men who participate/#
of livestock owning men

# of women who
participate/# of women in
sample population;
# of men who participate/#
of men in sample population
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Table 1 contd: List of indicators with formulae and findings from the literature review
Indicator

Formula

Caveats in
the literature
about
the
link
to
gender
equality

# of women who
participate/# of women in
sample population;
# of men who participate/#
of men in sample population
Sum of # of hours spent by
each woman;
sum of # of hours spent by
each man

Answers may
be strongly
determined by
socioeconomic
status
None

# of women who report
membership/# of women in
sample population;
# of men who report
membership/# of men in
sample population
# of women who report
attendance/# of women who
report membership;
# of men who report
attendance/# of men who
report membership
# of women who report
speaking/# of women who
report membership;
# of men who report
speaking/# of men who
report membership

Membership
may not mean
influence

Existence
of
large-scale
empirical studies
using
the
indicator (as well
as
small-scale
studies)

Water and Forest Resources
Use
Proportion of women and the
proportion of men able to access
water, firewood and fodder to
the desired degree
Number of hours (per week, per
person) for women and for men
in the household spent on
collecting water,firewood and
fodder
Control
The proportion of women and
the proportion of men who are
members of a water or forest
user group

The proportion of women and
the proportion of men who have
ever attended user group
meetings (conditional upon
membership)
The proportion of women and
the proportion of men who
report ever having spoken at
user group meetings (conditional
upon membership)

Yes

Yes

Attendance
may not mean
influence

None
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Table 1 contd: List of indicators with formulae and findings from the literature review
Indicator

Formula

Caveats in
the literature
about
the
link
to
gender
equality

Existence
of
large-scale
empirical studies
using
the
indicator (as well
as
small-scale
studies)

# of women banked/# of
women in sample
population;
# of men banked/# of men
in sample population

Having an
account may
not have the
same impact
as actively
using it
Increases
income
generation,
but mixed
evidence on
other aspects
of gender
equity
Savings may
take away
from needed
consumption

Yes

The impact of
the loan may
be different
depending on
whether it is
asset debt or
expense debt

Yes

None

Yes

Financial Assets
Use
Proportion of women and the
proportion of men banked
(individually or jointly) in a formal
sector institution

The average duration for women
and the average for men of
participation in a micro-/informal
financial institution

Average of numbers of
years of member ship for
women per woman
member; Average of
number of years of
membership per male
members

Proportion of women and the
proportion of men who have
saved money in the last 12
months through a formal or
informal institution (i.e., not
"under the pillow")

# of women who report
saving money/ # of women
in sample population;
# of men who report saving
money/ # of men in sample
population
# of women who report a
loan/# of women in sample
population;
# of men who report a
loan/# of men in sample
population

Proportion of women and the
proportion of men who received
a loan in the last 12 months from
a formal or informal institution

Control
Proportion of women and the
proportion of men who decided
how to use the loan/savings
amounts (conditional upon
saving, access to loan)

# of women who
participated in decision/ # of
women;
# of men who participated
in decision/ # of men

Yes

Yes

Yes
Proportion of women who
acquired ownership stake in the
asset, conditional upon asset
use of loan

# of women who acquired
stake/ # of women who
received loan;
# of men who acquired
stake / # of men who
received loan

CGIAR Gender and Agriculture Research Network. C/ CGIAR Consortium Office. gender.cgiar.org
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# of women who are
responsible/ # of women
who received loan;
# of men who are
responsible/ # of men who
received loan
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Table 1 contd: List of indicators with formulae and findings from the literature review
Indicator

Labor10
Use
Female labor force participation
rate and male rate in agriculture
(denominator, size of agricultural
labor force)

Female paid labor force
participation rate and male rate
in agriculture (denominator, size
of agricultural labor force)

Proportion of women and
proportion of men who report
that they are underemployed
(employed for fewer hours than
they want to be)

Average hours of leisure for
women and average hours for
men or proportion of women and
proportion of men who report
inadequate leisure time

Formula

Caveats in the
literature
about the link
to gender
equality

Existence of largescale empirical
studies using the
indicator (as well
as small-scale
studies)

# of women performing
agricultural SNA work/ # of
individuals performing or
seeking agricultural SNA
work;
# of men performing
agricultural SNA work/ # of
individuals performing or
seeking agricultural SNA
work;

Participation in
agriculture
may imply
exclusion from
nonagricultural
activities

Yes

Participation in
agriculture
may imply
exclusion from
nonagricultural
activities

Yes

# of women performing or
seeking agricultural SNA
work for wages/ # of
individuals performing or
seeking agricultural SNA
work;
# of men performing or
seeking agricultural SNA
work for wages/ # of
individuals performing or
seeking agricultural SNA
work
# of women who report
underemployment/# of
women performing
agricultural SNA work; # of
men who report
underemployment/# of men
performing agricultural SNA
work;
# of hours of leisure
reported by women/# of
women in sample
population;
# of hours of leisure
reported by men/# of men
in sample population

Control
No recommended indicators; see text for suggestions

10

SNA: UN System of National Accounts

64

Yes

Yes

Table 1 contd: List of indicators with formulae and findings from the literature review

Indicator
Formula

Income
Proportion of women and
proportion of men who retain any
part of their own earnings and/or
receive any part of the earnings
of any others in the household
Proportion of women and
proportion of men who
participate in decisions to
purchase daily goods
Proportion of women and
proportion of men who
participate in decisions to
purchase major goods
Proportion of women and
proportion of men who
participate in decision-making
about income generated from (a)
food crops, (b) cash crops, (c)
livestock production, (d) nonfarm
activities, and (e) wage and
salary work

Caveats in
the literature
about the link
to gender
equality

Existence of
large-scale
empirical studies
using the
indicator (apart
from small-scale
studies)

# of women who answer
yes/# of women in sample
population;
# of men who answer yes/#
of men in sample
population
Yes
For each:
# of women who
participate/# of women in
sample population;
# of men who participate/#
of men in sample
population
# of women who
participate/# of women in
sample population;
# of men who participate/#
of men in sample
population

Yes
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Table 1 contd: List of indicators with formulae and findings from the literature review
Community Groups
Participation
Average number of community
organizations/groups that
women are members of and
average number that men are
members of
Average number of agricultural
producer/farmer groups women
are members of and average
number that men are members
of
Proportion of women and
proportion of men who attended
village council meetings

Sum of # reported by each
woman/ # of women in
sample population;
sum of # reported by each
man/# of men in sample
population
Sum of # reported by each
woman /# of women in
sample population;
sum of # reported by each
man/ # of men in sample
population
# of women who report
attendance/# of women
who report membership;
# of men who report
attendance/ # of men who
report membership

Membership
does not
equate to
influence

Membership
does not
equate to
influence

Membership
does not
equate to
influence

Yes

Indicators of influence/control
Proportion of women and
proportion of men who spoke up
at community group/village
council meetings

# of women who report
speaking/# of women who
report membership; # of
men who report speaking/
# of men who report
membership

Proportion of female leaders and
proportion of male leaders who
are representatives in the village
council (publicly available data)

Yes
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Table 2: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time sensitivity
Note: Ownership and decision-making here refer to sole and joint combined. However, data
should be collected separately on sole and joint ownership and participation in decision-making.
Indicator

Resource intensity of data collection

Replicability

Time sensitivity

Required
indicator
already
available

Contexts
where
inapplicable

Short to
medium
term

Builds upon
existing data
instrument

No basis in
existing
international
surveys

Long
term

Land
Ownership
Proportion of
women/men who
own land

GAGP, LSMSISA

The average area of
land owned by
women and the
average owned by
men

GAGP, some
LSMS-ISA

The average sale
value of the land
owned by women
and the average
sale value of land
owned by men

GAGP

Where land is
state controlled
or collectively
controlled;
meaning of
ownership
varies
Where land is
state controlled
or collectively
controlled;
meaning of
ownership
varies
If no effective
land markets

Yes

Yes

Yes

Use
Proportion of women
and proportion of
men who participate
in decision-making
about the use of
crops (sale versus
own-consumption)

Yes

Control
Proportion of
women and
proportion of men
participating in
decisions about
the agricultural
use of land:
(a) crop choice,
(b) choice of
inputs, (c) timing
of cropping, (d)
sale/transfer of
land

FAO gender
and land rights
database, but
not
disaggregated
by decision
type; WEAI,
GAGP

Preferably
collected by
plot/crop, but
that depends
on the nature
of the gender
division of
labor (cropbased versus
crop- and plotbased)
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Table 2 contd: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time
sensitivity
Indicator

Resource intensity of data collection

Replicability

Time sensitivity

Livestock
categories must
be broad
enough to cover
local variations

Yes

Livestock
Ownership
The proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
who own livestock
(preferably by
livestock type, for
example: poultry,
sheep and goats,
cattle)
The average TLU
owned by women
and the average
TLU owned by men

WEAI (does not
ask about kinds
of livestock),
GAGP
(categorized by
livestock type)

Average sale value
of livestock owned
by women and the
average sale value
of livestock owned
by men

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Use
The proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
who participate in
decisions about
the use of dairy
products from
livestock (eggs,
milk, etc.)
The proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
who participate in
decisions about
the use of meat
(when livestock
are slaughtered)

Yes (may also
be inferred
from time-use
surveys)

Yes

Yes (may also
be inferred
from time-use
surveys)

Yes

Control
Livestock: the
proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
participating in
decisions about
the sale or
slaughter of
livestock

WEAI

Yes
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Table 2 contd: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time
sensitivity
Indicator

Resource intensity of data collection

Replicability

Time sensitivity

WWAP is
developing
indicators for
water.

Better-off
households/re
gions may not
perceive
shortages

Yes

Water and Forest
Resources
Use
Proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
able to access
water,firewood
and fodder to the
desired degree
Number of hours
(per week, per
person) for women
and for men in the
household, spent
on collecting
water,firewood
and fodder

National timeuse studies
(UN Statistics
Division), but
disaggregated
indicators are
not easily
available.

Yes

Control
The proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
who are members
of a water or forest
user group
The proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
who have ever
attended user
group meetings
(conditional upon
membership)
The proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
who report ever
having spoken at
user group
meetings
(conditional upon
membership).

WEAI has a
general
question about
membership in
village-level
groups.

WEAI has a
question about
being
comfortable
speaking in
groups.

Groups may
not exist in
particular
regions

Yes

Groups may
not exist in
particular
regions; may
not hold
regular
meetings

Yes

Groups may
not exist in
particular
regions; may
not hold
regular
meetings
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Table 2 contd: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time
sensitivity
Indicator

Resource intensity of data collection

Replicability

Time sensitivity

Proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
banked
(individually or
jointly) in a formal
sector institution
The average
length of time
(duration) for
women and the
average for men
of participation in
a micro- or
informal financial
institution
Proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
who saved money
in the last 12
months through a
formal or informal
institution (i.e., not
"under the pillow")

Findex

Depends on
network of
formal sector
financial
institutions

Yes

Findex

Yes

Proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
who received a
loan in the last 12
months from a
formal or informal
institution

Findex

Yes

Financial Assets
Use

Yes
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Table 2 contd: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time
sensitivity
Indicator

Resource intensity of data collection

Replicability

Time sensitivity

WWAP is
developing
indicators for
water.

Better-off
households/re
gions may not
perceive
shortages

Yes

Water and Forest
Resources
Use
Proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
able to access
water/firewood/fod
der/fish to the
desired degree
Number of hours
(per week, per
person) for women
and for men in the
household, spent
on collecting
water/firewood/fod
der/fish

National timeuse studies
(UN Statistics
Division), but
disaggregated
indicators are
not easily
available.

Yes

Control
The proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
who are members
of a water or forest
user group
The proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
who have ever
attended user
group meetings
(conditional upon
membership)
The proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
who report ever
having spoken at
user group
meetings
(conditional upon
membership).

WEAI has a
general
question about
membership in
village-level
groups.

WEAI has a
question about
being
comfortable
speaking in
groups.

Groups may
not exist in
particular
regions

Yes

Groups may
not exist in
particular
regions; may
not hold
regular
meetings

Yes

Groups may
not exist in
particular
regions; may
not hold
regular
meetings
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Table 2 contd: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time
sensitivity
Indicator

Resource intensity of data collection

Replicability

Time
sensit
ivity

Financial Assets
Use
Proportion of women
and the proportion of
men banked
(individually or
jointly) in a formal
sector institution

Findex

Depends on
network of
formal sector
financial
institutions

The average length
of time (duration) for
women and the
average for men of
participation in a
micro- or informal
financial institution

Yes

Yes

Yes

Proportion of women
and the proportion of
men who saved
money in the last 12
months through a
formal or informal
institution (i.e., not
"under the pillow")

Findex

Yes

Proportion of women
and the proportion of
men who received a
loan in the last 12
months from a
formal or informal
institution

Findex

Yes

Control
Proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
who decided how
to use the
loan/savings
amounts
(conditional upon
saving, access to
loan)
Conditional upon
asset use of loan;
proportion of
women who
acquire ownership
stake in the asset

Yes

GAGP

CGIAR Gender and Agriculture Research Network. C/ CGIAR Consortium Office. gender.cgiar.org

Yes

Yes

CGIAR Gender and Agriculture Network

Proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
responsible for
repayment of the
loan (conditional
upon loan receipt)

Working Paper No.1

GAGP

June 2016

Yes

Table 2 contd: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time
sensitivity
Indicator

Resource intensity of data collection

Replicability

Time
sensit
ivity

Labor
Use
Female labor force
participation rate
and the male rate in
agriculture
(denominator, size
of agricultural labor
force)

World
Developme
nt
Indicators

Depends on
gender
division of
labor

Yes

Female paid labor
force participation
rate and the male
rate in agriculture
(denominator, size
of agricultural labor
force)

World
Developme
nt
Indicators,
national
household
surveys

Depends on
gender
division of
labor

Yes

Proportion of women
and the proportion of
men who report that
they are
underemployed
(employed for fewer
hours than they
want to be)
Average hours of
leisure for women
and the average for
men; or the
proportion of women
and the proportion
of men who report
inadequate leisure
time

Yes

WEAI, national
time-use
surveys

Yes

Yes

Control
No recommended
indicators; see text
for suggestions
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CGIAR Gender and Agriculture Network

Working Paper No.1

June 2016
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Indicator

Resource intensity of data collection

Replicability

Time
sensit
ivity

Control
No recommended
indicators; see text
for suggestions
Income
Proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
who retain any
part of their own
earnings and/or
receive any part of
the earnings of
any others in the
household

Yes

Yes

Proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
who participate in
decisions to
purchase daily
goods

DHS

YES

Proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
who participate in
decisions to
purchase major
goods
Proportion of
women and the
proportion of men
who participate in
decision-making
about income
generated from (a)
food crops, (b)
cash crops, (c)
livestock
production, (d)
nonfarm activities,
and (e) wage and
salary work

DHS

YES

WEAI

YES
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Table 2 contd: Evaluation of indicators: resource intensity, replicability, and time
sensitivity
Indicator

Resource intensity of data collection

Replicability

Time
sensit
ivity

Community
Groups
Participation
Average number
of community
organizations/grou
ps that women
are members of,
average that men
are members of

WEAI has a
general
question about
membership in
village-level
groups

Average number
of agricultural
producer/farmer
groups that
women are
members of, that
men are members
of
Proportion of
women and
proportion of men
who attended
village council
meetings

Condition
al upon
existence
of locallevel
communit
y bodies

Yes

Yes

Condition
al upon
existence
of locallevel
communit
y bodies

Yes

Yes

Condition
al upon
existence
of
elections

Yes

Yes

Condition
al upon
existence
of locallevel
communit
y bodies

Yes

Condition
al upon
existence
of locallevel
communit
y bodies

Yes

Indicators of
influence/control

Proportion of
women and
proportion of men
who spoke up at
community
group/village
council meetings
Proportion of
female leaders
and proportion of
male leaders who
are
representatives in
the village council
(publicly available
data)

WEAI has a
general
question about
membership in
village-level
groups

CGIAR Gender and Agriculture Research Network. C/ CGIAR Consortium Office. gender.cgiar.org

